Policy and Corruption in the Advanced and Developing Country*

- An Analysis of the System of External and Internal Control in Administration Control -

선진국과 개발도상국의 정책과 부패

- 행정통제의 외부와 내부 통제 시스템의 분석 -

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국문초록

　이 연구의 목적은 선진국과 개발도상국의 부패 방지를 위한 정책과 전략의 고찰을 통해 선진국과 개도국의 효율적인 반부패 전략을 파악하는 것이다. 행정통제의 기능과 역할에서 선진국과 개발도상국들은 부패 방지를 위한 다양한 정책을 추진하고 있다. 미국과 영국 선진국들의 반부패 정책은 내부 통제 전략과 함께 시민사회, 입법부, 사법부, 이익단체, 여론, 언론 등을 포함하는 외부 통제의 수단들이 효과적인 기능과 역할을 하고 있으며, 이러한 외부 통제 전략은 효율적인 부패 방지 전략으로 인식되고 있다. 하지만, 개발도상국에 선진국의 신 공공관리론의 적용은 문화적, 정치적, 사회적 환경의 차이로 인하여 성공적이지 못한 것으로 평가되고 있다. 개발도상국들은 선진국들의 경우와 달리 부패 방지 전략을 위한 효율적인 외부 통제 메커니즘이 미흡하다. 개발도상국의 효율적인 외부 통제 시스템의 기능과 역할이 부재한 상황에서 부패 방지를 위한 정책으로 외부 통제보다는 내부 통제 전략의 필요성에 대해 분석하였다.

주제어: 부패, 정책, 행정통제, 외부 통제, 내부 통제

Ⅰ. Introduction

The issue of corruption is multidimensional. Corruption as a prevalent form of criminal activity is a serious problem in the developmental process of the nation, which is associated with the lowest rate of economic growth. It affects the attitude of the people towards the public officials, the State, and the market with the reduction of productive activities. Corruption generates the loss of confidence in the authorities′ transparency and social justice, which leads to inequality.

It is proposed that successful anti-corruption strategies have included measures to reduce opportunities for the benefits of corruption. The failure of anti-corruption strategies has included the subsequent loss of public confidence and failure to establish institutional mechanisms on influential, political, and social levels, which is leading to the failure of the government(Kindra & Stapenhurst 1998). Good governance depends on participatory democracy in advanced countries. A government can be legitimate if it is based on the consent of the governed through a recognized participatory process with the free flow of information, the accountability of media, transparency in decision making.

An effective government policy is needed that should address good governance to create and implement anti-corruption strategies. The anti-corruption agency is one of the efficient policies of governments. The government has a significant role to play in combatting corruption. The state should eliminate corruption by ensuring effective government, eliminating ineffective regulations, and providing better information. The purpose of this study is to explore the essence of the relationship between policies and strategies to combat corruption in advanced and developing countries. The purpose of this research is to identify different anti-corruption strategies in the advanced States and the developing countries, which will address the following objectives, including the main features of anti-corruption strategies, anti-corruption measures in different states, and the means of the effective policy on the strategy of internal and external control.

Ⅱ. Theoretical Argument and Literature

Corruption is a form of dishonesty or criminal activity undertaken by an individual

or organization to obtain illegal benefits. Political corruption occurs when a public office holder or other government employee acts in a formal capacity for profit. Grand corruption is described as corruption that appears at the highest levels of government which is an important subversion of political and economic systems. The anti-corruption strategy is a government initiative to develop a national consensus on how to address corruption issues as a whole. Ultimately, with the reduction of the frequency of the occurrence of corruption, it is required to change from systemic corruption (institutionalized corruption) to accidental corruption for the minimization of corruption with political transparency.

Corruption is the abuse of government power by an elected politician or an appointed official for private purposes. That can happen in both the public and private sectors. From the legal point of view, no strategy or policy will succeed without taking into consideration the causes of a particular criminal activity. Corruption is defined as the misuse of public authority for private gain. The forms of corruption include the acceptance of money or other illegal payments for awarding contracts and tax evasion(Doing, 1995:152).

The corruptive action of politicians and public servants through the abuse of their powers should be prevented through administrative control, including internal and external control. Corruption can destroy all kinds of government policies and programs, impede development, and harm individuals and social groups(Doing, 1995:152).

Corruption is a significant barrier to development. Theoretical literature shows that corruption is negatively associated with economic outcomes which reduce growth (Lederman, 2005:1). The process of democracy will, in essence, be required to attain economic development for promoting political and social equality; clean politics including the transparency and accountability of government's organization and institution is a pre-condition of economic development in the long term(Yun, 2015:294). Moreover, corruption has infiltrated the complex relations between the state and the market, endangering the mechanisms for building political consensus and reinforcing political crisis(Porta and Vannucci, 1999:7).

Furthermore, the literature on corruption has become a central issue in the economic and political environment. Theoretical literature in political science, sociology, and economy has made many attempts to explain the tendencies of this phenomenon. It is important to understand the determinants of corruption as well as the effects (Lederman, 2005:1). The traditional concept of corruption is centered on the moral

vitality of society(Johnston, 1996:322). The term "corruption" refers less to individual action than to the division of power within society. Consequently, for most political participants, corruption refers to the actions of those in public office(Johnston, 1996:322).

Modern literature on corruption can be explained from the point of view of Heidenheimer's distinction between public-office-centered, market-centered, and public-interest-centered(Heywood, 1997). According to Heidenheimer(1978), the definition of corruption is the form of the individual and the organization as illegal corrupt behaviors and actions to achieve wealth or power.

First, in the public office view of corruption, "corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role" because of the use of personal tie, close family, private clique for pecuniary or status gains; or "violates rules against the exercise of the certain types of public office". This includes such behavior as bribery, nepotism, and misappropriation. The core of public service corruption is based on an unlawful feature in an attempt to influence or depart from the rules imposed in the public service.

Second, market-oriented definitions may provide another explanation of the impact of corruption. In the view of Jacob van Klaveren(Mark, 1997:444), market-based corruption means that an officeholder will use their authority to obtain illegal revenues from the public. In this respect, corruption refers to officials who treat their offices as a business, seeking to maximize their revenues.

Third, there is defined corruption concerning the public interest. Carl Friedrich(Mark, 1997:440) argues that corruption emerges when a power-holder, an officeholder, or public manager is motivated by money or other illegal reward-motivated to undertake actions that favor the illegal payment which does damage to the public interest.

In summary, Heidenheimer argues that corruption has a different history of meaning and justice. On the whole, actors and the action of realizing personal interest in opposition to the public good and acquiring wealth or power through illegal means are regarded as corruption. Heidenheimer(1978) classifies corruption in three ways: public office-centered, market-centered, and public interest-centered. The public office-centered view defines corruption as "a deviation from the laws and regulations imposed on public officials to gain money and secure status". The market-driven perspective defines corruption as "a payment of excessive costs due to a lower supply of government services than demand". A public interest-centered view defines

corruption as a deviation from the public interest.

To prevent the situation and the condition of the corruption, including public-office-centered, market-centered, and public-interest-centered views, the means of administrative control may be necessary. The types of administrative control are divided into external and internal controls according to the standards of the direction of the subject and influence. External control is the control of persons or institutions outside the administration, such as the National Assembly, the judiciary, the interest groups, the media, etc., whereas internal control is controlled by the members of the administrative organization.

Administrative control can be divided into external institutional or formal control, internal institutional or formal control, external behavioral or informal control, and internal behavioral or informal control. First, external institutional control is recognized as a great effect of administrative control, which is an example of administrative control of the National Assembly, the judiciary, civic groups, the ombudsman, the media, and political parties. Second, internal institutional control is a control method carried out by an evaluation organization within an institution, which is a case of administrative control through the President, Office of Government Policy Coordination, the Board of Audit and Inspection, Department, etc. Third, external behavioral control is related to the administrative culture underlying the consciousness and behavior of administrative bureaucrats, which is the case of administrative control through changes in consciousness and behavior from a long-term perspective. As a process of recreating citizens, it is to control the consciousness and behavior of public officials through citizens' interest in administrative culture. Fourth, internal behavioral control is a strategy of administrative control through the change of public officials' consciousness and behavior within the administration. The Code of Ethics and Internal Accusation System belongs to this type. Rather than direct control over specific administrative actions, it focuses on cultivating values that affect the actions of public officials.

To put it concretely, external institutional or formal control can be divided into control of the legislature, control of the judiciary, control of the citizens, control by the interest groups, control by the media, and control through the ombudsman system. First, the legislative body's means of control include legislative deliberation, budget deliberation, activities of various standing committees, parliamentary investigation and audit activities, approval of appointment and dismissal, impeachment rights, petition

system, etc. Second, judicial review involves monitoring the administration by examining the unlawful and unjust violation of rights. The means of judicial review include the judgment of administrative litigation, orders, and rules. Third, citizen control means direct administrative control of the general population. Control methods include the exercise of the right to vote, the operation of civil service offices, various resident participation systems such as neighborhood meetings and public hearings as the control by civic activist groups. Fourth, the control of interest groups means the control of administration by the political needs of interest groups. Fifth, the control of public opinion and the mass media is the control of the government through the public debate on social issues. Sixth, the control of the ombudsman system is intended to protect the interests of the people as a complementary institutional measure of the administrative control function of Congress or the judiciary.

Internal institutional or formal controls include "control by administrative system" and "control by official structure". Internal informal control includes the autonomous control of the administrator for the transition of administrative culture. In the case of internal official control, control by the head of an administrative branch is the responsibility and authority to supervise the whole administrative system, which is to control the administrative system through the means of the right to appoint public officials, the right to reorganization, the right to administrative reform, the right to make a policy decision and the exercise of authority by leadership. "Control through the structure of the official system" means control of the administrative affairs of the supervisory authorities. Internal informal control for the change of the administrative culture is the case of autonomous control in which administrators regulate themselves according to the standards of professional ethics, while internal formal control is performed by the establishment of an institution as the independent agency in the government.

Administrative control strategies for preventing corruption may be effective in developing countries. In the analysis of the priorities of control strategies, external control is more effective than internal control considering the sense of identity and defensive instinct among administrative officials in the advanced countries. In terms of control through consciousness change that takes a long time, institutional control is more effective than behavioral control from the perspective of controlling overall consciousness and attitude rather than direct control over specific administrative actions because the sound cultural transformation through the change of values and

consciousness will be achieved by a long period.

As a result, the effect of administrative control is analyzed in external institutional control and internal institutional control rather than external behavioral control and internal behavioral control. The successful strategy of external behavioral control is attained by the formation of civic culture and the successful strategy of internal behavioral control is achieved by sound bureaucratic culture such as the case of advanced countries. External institutional controls are effectively working in democratic countries of the separation of powers.

However, the separation system of the three powers of administration, legislation, and judicature is not effectively operated in developing countries. Civic culture and the sound bureaucratic culture are lacking such as in the case of advanced countries. As a result, the function of administrative control by an internal institutional control strategy can be recognized as the most effective administrative control strategy in developing countries.

Ⅲ. Good Governance

Governance may be viewed from a social, political, or economic point of view. The importance of excellent governance in the process of development can be critical. The engagement of citizens, the rule of law, the transparency of the system, the responsiveness of authority, consensus-oriented policy, the equity of the policy, and system accountability can be regarded as the type of good governance. Human rights are improved by good government, which is the biggest goal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Democracy of free representation is the most effective form of government. Liberal democracy and welfare democracy are successful, while Illiberal democracy, populist direct democracy, referendum democracy, theocracy, and authoritarianism fail to provide good governance.

Democracy represents the various types of liberal democracy, totalitarian democracy, and welfare democracy. First, liberal democracy emphasizes political freedom rather than economic equality. Freedom based on liberal democracy supports natural rights and individualism. The type of democracy provides not only political freedom but also economic freedom. There cannot be perfect equality in a liberal democracy because the abilities, talents, and diligences of men are not the same. Economic inequality as an

issue of liberal democracy is indicated.

Second, in terms of totalitarian democracy, the type of democracy is based on "economic democracy" since economic equality has occurred through economic groups participating in the decision-making process. This type of system is democratic, whereas liberal democracy does not have economic equality. Totalitarian democracy is about economic equality instead of political freedom. In the totalitarian system, there is opposition to individualism as emphasized in liberal democratic nations. The basis of totalitarian democracy is economic equality; however, there is no political freedom. As a consequence, the system cannot be a true democracy.

Third, welfare democracy is the mix of liberal democracy and totalitarian democracy. In a welfare democracy, political freedom and economic equality should coexist. However, there is another problem in terms of the coexistence of political freedom and economic equality.

Overall, real democracy can be achieved in some steps: the first is that all believers and races should accept openly, the second is that economic equality is retained by the entire people, and the third step is substantial income equalization. Political freedom is harmonious with economic equality.

According to "democracy", popular elections are necessary for democracy. The rule of law is the fundamental necessity as the transparent form of government. The Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden, etc. are the best examples. The increased risks of misinformation, mass manipulation, and populist rule are the negative consequences. To serve the common interest of the community, good governance must be responsive, responsible, and transparent with responsibility, general interest, and openness.

The World Bank defines 'good governance' with six main characteristics: 1. Voice and accountability, which includes civil liberties and political stability; 2. Government effectiveness, which includes the quality of policymaking and public service delivery; 3. The quality of regulatory framework; 4. The rule of law, which includes protection of property rights; 5. Independence of the judiciary; and 6. Curbing corruption(Riggirozzi, 2009 & Kaufmann, 1999).

Although the developing and authoritarian countries, which can be regarded as a high level of corruption, can sometimes lead to economic growth in a short period, there has, in effect, been a substantial correlation between good governance of clean politics and economic development in the long period(Yun, 2015:294). Good governance

is characterized by an accountable government at the top, an independent judicial system, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of choice for its citizens. Good governance involves democracy, human rights, and media freedom. The process of governance involves factors such as accountability and transparency in pursuing values such as justice and equity.

It is well known that the indicators of public governance such as the rule of law, institutional reliability, and responsibility are linked to the process of economic development in the advanced capitalistic countries, whereas corruption is a great obstacle to the process of economic and local development like the case of developing countries(Yun, 2015:294). In this vast conceptualization of good governance, the World Bank conceptualizes good governance as the management of a country's resources and affairs in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, equitable, and responsive to people's needs. Others argue that governance is 'good' when it serves the public interest(Aminuzzaman, 2006). Participation, legitimacy, accountability, transparency, competence are the parameters that are identified for promoting good governance expressed by the Overseas Development Administration(ODA). Corruption acts as a negative factor for economic, social, and political development, which ultimately collapses social trust and induces inequality.

Ⅳ. Anti-Corruption Strategies in the advanced and developing country

Corruption is a cost to developing countries on many points, including subversion of development plans and misappropriation of resources, disrupting the transparent and normal functioning of markets. The basic points come from a New Institutional Economics which has defined efficient markets with low transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of completing transactions, including the costs of negotiating and executing contracts. If these costs are very high, markets are inefficient, and critical transactions like long-term investments are unlikely to happen(Khan, 2006). Better governance of development can be presented as a precondition or means of ensuring development, which are institutional and political conditions for ensuring low transaction costs in market economies(Khan, 2006).

The persistence of unstable property rights and welfare-reducing interventions in developing countries is explained by rent-seeking and corruption(Krueger, 1974; Mauro, 1997; Kaufmann, 1997). The few beneficiaries of corruption and rent-seeking can continue their activities, although the vast majority of the company suffers from it. The majority is poorly organized and there is an absence or weakness of democratic accountability that allows the minority to effectively exploit the majority(Clague et al., 1996). Poverty and under-development limit the organizational capacity of the majority with sustained poverty and underdevelopment.

Regarding the types of corruption control, Gillespie and Okruklik(1991) & Aron(2009) have, to a great extent, classified the measures of controlling corruption in the following. Societal strategies focus on ethical norms, education, and public awareness. There is a general agreement among scholars that no cleanup measure can be effective if society as a whole does not accept and promote certain standards of behavior regarding fairness(Aron, 2009). In all countries, there are legal strategies and legal codes which forbid corrupt activities. Legal sanctions are effective only in the presence of complementary strategies: increased penalties for corruption, the existence of independent auditing and investigative institutions, the existence of an independent justice system, and the determination of the government to curb corruption(Gillespie and Okruklik, 1991).

Many researchers have evaluated marketplace strategies. Corruption is aggravated by governmental interference in the economy and bureaucratic inertia. In such conditions, the result will be an imbalance between the supply and demand of goods and services. The prescribed strategy for the elimination of corruption is to allow market forces to operate without government intervention in advanced countries.

Political strategies encourage the removal of corrupt activities by continuing the process of administrative reforms. In terms of administrative reform, one tactic is to give the key decision to committees rather than an individual. Furthermore, the possibilities of engaging in corruption activities would be diminished if all laws were made more precise, leaving nothing to the discretion of the authorities.

In addition, some researchers suggest that substantial citizen participation in political processes reduces the ability of politicians to lift or gain illegal benefits. Finally, those who argue in favor of administrative reform emphasize the discouragement of corrupt behavior by increasing the benefits of non-corrupt conduct including increased salaries or pensions(Aron, 2009) and mutual antagonistic surveillance between government

agencies(Gillespie and Okruklik, 1991). According to Gillespie and Okruklik, a significant strategy to eliminate corruption is maximizing public access to the decision-making process in advanced countries.

1. The main approaches of the anti-corruption strategy

There are the following political, economic, cultural, social factors to induce corruption, including political monopolization, the low level of democracy, weak civil participation, low political transparency, inefficient administrative structures, low press freedom, low economic freedom, the low level of education, the high level of in-group favoritism, gender inequality, and political instability in the world.

Today, corruption is a major problem in developing countries where there is poverty. In general, political, economic, cultural, and social factors are the major cause of corruption in the developing world. Advanced countries such as Denmark, New Zealand, Switzerland, Finland, Singapore, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and so on, which show the highest level of democracy, high political transparency, high economic freedom, the high level of education, and political stability, are regarded as the nation of integrity.

There are (at least) three major schools of reflection about the reduction and prevention of corruption. First, interventionism as in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong is the type of punishment for corrupt acts to capture and punish the offender. This school encourages punishment, deterrence, and punishment, but there are still many obstructive variables, including the majority of unreported crimes.

Second, for managerialism, the motivation of individuals or agencies seeking to engage in corrupt behavior can be discouraged or avoided by establishing appropriate systems, procedures, and protocols. In essence, managerialism advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities for corrupt action and behavior, such as the illustration of advanced countries.

Third, organizational integrity involves integrating an organization's operational systems with control strategies and ethical standards to create a standard of ethical behavior. This school supposes that deviance derives from the organization rather than individuals. Therefore, targeting individuals in anti-corruption efforts may be less effective than targeting the organizational context in which individuals operate. It was suggested that the organization should provide a structural framework that removes

the potential for fraudulent practices(Larmour & Wolanin, 2001).

Good governance offers a series of parallel political priorities. These interdependent policy processes have combined economic reform with institutional and political reform as a good governance reform agenda. The global anti-corruption policies are summarized in table 1. Global anti-corruption policies are represented by the anti-corruption strategies of different countries. Therefore, consideration of such anti-corruption policies would be beneficial to illustrate the importance of effective policies, including the system of external and internal control. However, while there are positive advantages, all anti-corruption policies have some drawbacks. The traditional economic reform on market competitiveness includes a wide range of political and institutional reforms. Anti-corruption reforms play a major part in the new reform agenda. Anticorruption reforms have an important process.

Table 1. The global anti-corruption policies

Measure	Geography	Epistemology	Disadvantages	Advantages
Anti-corruption Commission, establishment of external agencies	Inspired from Hong Kong and Singapore	Institutionalist	Parallelism in government, fuzzy accountability creates impression of inevitable dysfunction	Creates oversight facility when corruption endemic in mainstream government ministries
Integrity workshops and ethical codes of conduct	TI, Europe	Normative, moralism	Easy to adopt without policy change; shallow interventionism	Changes behaviour; reduces resistance to reform; changes organisational culture
Raising salaries of top civil servants	Hong Kong, Singapore	Neoliberal, econometric	Creates impression that public office remains the site for rapid private gain; large inequality justifiable	Reduces incentives for corruption. Allows civil servant to feel valued and respond with loyalty
Public service downsizing	UK, US	Neoliberal, new public management	Loss of seniority and experience; disrupts state-class reproduction and can cause social instability	Reduces ghost workers and loss of public revenue to corrupt payrolls. Can increase meritocratic criteria of appointment
e-technology	European	Technocist	No necessary human attitude change	Can reduce opportunities for corruption in discretionary decisions
Anti-corruption campaign	IFI	Postcolonial, interventionist	Symbolic violence and 'Othering'; pathologises politics of majority South; creates distrust of indigenous institutions; fuels a political culture based on scandal	Can package a set of reforms into one appealing discourse and raise political consciousness, knowledge and support for reform
Conditionality	IFI	Realist	Blunt instrument subject to geopolitical abuse	Allows for punitive basis for incentive where necessary
International Conventions	Global	Liberal	Judicial reach is poor when conventions not domiciled	Allows reformers to internationalise their efforts and recruit cosmopolitan support and solidarity. Creates norms of behaviour
Democratisation	*Global*	*Solidarist; social democratic*	*Long term policy; requires consistent policies of social justice and resource distribution; North needs to change too.*	*Embeds permanent values of accountability and transparency and the institutional means to achieve them*

Source: Bracking, Sarah. (2007:300-301). "Corruption and Development. The Anti-Corruption Campaigns" *IFI- International financial institution

In global anti-corruption policies of the table, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the establishment of independent agencies in Hong Kong and Singapore establish oversight mechanisms where corruption is endemic in key government ministries in terms of advantages, while vague accountability gives the impression of inevitable dysfunction and parallelism in government in the view of disadvantages(Bracking, 2007). In addition, increasing the salaries of senior public servants reduces incentives for corruption, which allows public servants to feel valued and respond loyally (Bracking, 2007).

In the UK and USA, measuring the downsizing of the public service, as the adoption of the New Public Management, reduces ghost workers and the loss of public revenue due to payroll corruption, which can increase the meritocratic criteria of appointment in advantage, whereas there is a loss of seniority and experience that disrupts state class reproduction and can cause social instability in disadvantages(Bracking, 2007).

In the European countries, the measure of anti-corruption is normative moralism and e-technology, which is a change in behavior that reduces resistance to reform through organizational culture change(Bracking, 2007). Moreover, the adoption of electronic technology may reduce the possibility of corruption in discretionary decisions(Bracking, 2007).

2. Anticorruption strategy and measure in different states

The effectiveness of a national anti-corruption strategy will depend to a large extent on how it is designed to take into consideration the context and situation of the country. Moreover, the political will and coordination to fight corruption and improve governance in the country are crucial in developing countries. Moreover, anti-corruption strategies should include strong and manageable monitoring with the functioning of an effective evaluation system. Anti-corruption strategies are implemented throughout national policies. Those policies' success depends on the following factors: the effective system of internal control in administrative control, the political will for anti-corruption strategy, the provision of transparency and the principle of open to the public, the freedom of mass media, and strict punishment system.

1) The policy of the advanced states for anti-corruption strategy

Advanced states have an effective system of external control, such as civil society, the media, etc. By denouncing corruption and putting pressure on the government, people in advanced countries are aware of their rights and responsibilities that corruption is regarded as a serious crime. Advanced state policies recognize the role of the private sector and create opportunities for the private sector to address corruption with a high standard of governance.

In the United States, the federal government introduced a management system to fight corruption through an active reform process, from cronyism to bureaucracy. Efficient internal and external control to prevent corruption in terms of senior politicians and state officials is performed.

In the United Kingdom, the main content of the 1883 An Act for the Better Prevention of Corrupt and illegal Practices of Parliamentary Elections was to impose heavy penalties on corruption, such as bribery. Efforts to prevent fraud in the UK are made by the Treating Act of 1696; the Bribery Act of 1729; the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854; the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883; and the Representative of the People Act of 1949.

The UK has adopted a government-wide anti-corruption strategy for the years 2017 to 2022. Published in December 2017, the anti-corruption strategy establishes an ambitious long-term framework to guide UK government efforts to tackle corruption at home and abroad in the period to 2022. It sets out a long-term vision of anti-corruption actions. The efforts of strategy are joined up across government and include close collaboration with civil society, private sector, law enforcement, and other partners – who play a critical role in tackling corruption.

To prevent administrative inefficiency, the enactment of government reform laws for the public good, the privatization of administration, the reduction of public spending, and deregulation are used as the notion of New Public Management. Overall, the administrative management system in the UK and USA emphasizes the principle of New Public Management that seeks fairness and accountability in the process of making public policies through political neutrality. While the application of the system of New Public Management was successful in anti-corruption administrative systems such as fairness, transparency, and equity during the policy implementation process in the advanced countries, whereas the introduction of the New Public Management

theory in corrupt administrative systems in underdeveloped countries was not successful.

The British and American governments have been pushing for innovative reforms that emphasized accountability by breaking away from the rigidity of the centralized structure and giving responsible authority to the managers and organizations of each department. The government reform pursues the principle of New Public Management that values, responsibility, and autonomy by granting some autonomy to each institution and ministry rather than specific central control and monitoring. The direction of British and American government reform was to exclude centralized top-down command control and delivery, along with the removal of the authorities and rigidity of centralization. Strengthening autonomous accountability, increasing autonomy and discretion, specializing in bureaucracy, and establishing an efficient management system of flexibility are major strategies for British and American government reform. The fundamental reform principle is based on the new concept of public management of equity and fairness between regions and classes, breaking away from factionalism between governments and local governments.

As mentioned, the British and American government reforms, based on the principle of New Public Management, are not vertical mandated government management, but rather by orienting horizontal organizational structures to improve national services. To promote administrative decentralization and administrative accountability, a trust society based on the growth of civil society in the process and performance of work must be preconditioned, which is a necessary condition for the application of the theory of New Public Management(Yun, 2011).

Concerning corruption and the system, it will be necessary to analyze the institutional connection between corruption and the system, including pluralism and corporatism. In a capitalist democracy, the difference between the form and content of capitalism can be established by the theory of pluralism and corporatism. In the theory of pluralism, voluntary interest groups seek democratic policy decisions by exercising a fundamental influence on government policies such as the case of the UK and USA, while the role of state power over voluntary interest groups in the theory of corporatism is emphasized.

In the case of developed countries, the case of Australia can be regarded as a successful case of internal control. The New South Wales ICAC was established in 1987 when the political leaders decided to create an agency similar to the Hong Kong

model but with a crucial difference: the new agency emphasized prevention(Aron, 2009). After beginning its activity, the New South Wales ICAC managed to build public trust through a mixed record of successful prosecutions; its major contribution is that, through prevention(Aron, 2009). It managed to change the norms of how business is conducted in New South Wales(Heilbrunn, 2004). The primary function of an independent and separate agency is to provide centralized leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity(Meagher, 2005:70). The agency involves policy analysis and technical assistance, surveillance, investigation, and prosecution, which is required for preventing severe corruption in developing countries because of the lack of external control in administration control.

2) The policy of the developing states for anti-corruption strategy

It should be noted that the elimination of corruption in developing countries is becoming increasingly important due to the rise of economic development(Yun, 2015). The developing countries, which can be regarded as the type of state corporatism, are recognized as having the highest level of corruption. More than a hundred developing countries are regularly taking an active part and expressing their determination to combat corruption in anti-corruption strategies. The anti-corruption strategy in most developing countries can be effective in internal control instead of external control in administration control.

Many developing countries are attempting to induce the process of national economic development to overcome the high level of poverty. Another element that causes corruption in developing countries is being developed with the low level of education in developing countries. Today, developing countries continue to implement anti-corruption strategies based on these principles, including transparency, accountability, and merit-based human resource management. Developing countries face certain challenges. Underdeveloped countries do not have the same means of escaping corruption as advanced countries.

The problem of corruption in developing countries cannot be solved simply by adopting the theory of New Public Management that works in advanced states such as the UK and USA, which have induced the effective role of legislation, the process of decentralization, and the reduction of state power. A reduction in corruption depends on political and economic development which leads to a virtuous circle of development and

good governance. However, the developing countries of the Third World do not achieve the process of democracy, including political and economic development. Anti-corruption strategies for internal control rather than external control such as the case of Singapore and Hong Kong would be effective in the case of developing countries because of the underdevelopment of civil society.

In the case of Singapore, corruption and disorder were rampant from 1940 to early 1950 as an underdeveloped country, and corruption and bribery were a lifestyle in Singapore. The CPIB(Corrupt Practice Investigation Bureau) is an independent organization established in 1952, which is responsible for preventing and investigating corruption in Singapore. Singapore's CPIP has strong authority to fight corruption, including strong investigative power, which can be investigated, regardless of status, public office, and private sector.

Singapore is regarded as one of the countries that have a clean society without corruption, which can be attributed to the government's strong stance on fighting corruption and political leadership that does not tolerate corruption. The agency that plays a pivotal role in Singapore's maintenance of such a clean society is the Office of the Prime Minister's Office(PMO) investigation into corruption as the type of internal institutional control. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau(CPIB) was founded in 1952, before Singapore's independence. Corruption prevailed in Singapore until the 1940s and early 1950s, but in 1952 the government launched the CPIB as an independent organization. In 1959, the People's Action Party, led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, dismissed corrupt officials and demonstrated strong anti-corruption policies based on public trust. The CPIB enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 and the Confidence of Benefits Act 1989. The function of the CPIB is to investigate corruption reports in the public or private sector. The main targets are illegal commissions in commerce and financial transactions, ultimately part of efforts to secure confidence between overseas investors and businesses while maintaining competitiveness.

In the case of Hong Kong, until the mid-1970s, Hong Kong was evaluated as having a society in turmoil due to corruption. Corrupt practices have become commonplace in Hong Kong society, which has been urbanized with rapid economic growth since the 1960s. Hong Kong's recognition as a highly competitive country by the international community is attained by a major role in the active corruption eradication activities of the Independent Commission Against Corruption(ICAC), which was launched in 1974,

by promoting strong anti-corruption measures and policies.

As a part of political and legal strategies, the establishment of anti-corruption agencies has become one of the best-known government responses in recent decades(Aron, 2009). The history of anti-corruption agencies starts in the early 1950s when Singapore established an anti-corruption commission and continued with the Hong Kong Bureau and the New South Wales Independent Commission(Aron, 2009). The type of institution can be explained by the fact that corruption is widely recognized as an important malfunction of public administration only in the 20th century(Meagher, 2005:70). The literature considers the anti-corruption agencies of Hong Kong and New South Wales as successful examples for creating strong centralized agencies on the ground.

The Hong Kong ICAC has enjoyed continued success since its inception in 1974. It monitors corruption through investigative and preventive means. However, when it was established, the ICAC had a limited effect; nevertheless, the repatriation and successful prosecution of Peter Godber(senior police officer) increased the agency's credibility. From that moment, the ICAC has built an impressive record of investigations and convictions(Heilbrunn, 2004:3-5).

Looking at the anti-corruption strategies of Singapore and Hong Kong, several important implications can be found. Most importantly, securing the independence of organizations dedicated to eradicating corruption determines the success or failure of corrupt policies. Singapore and Hong Kong are pursuing anti-corruption strategies centered on CPIB and ICAC, respectively. Their corruption control strategies suggest the need for a strong corruption control body for underdeveloped countries. However, developing countries that benchmarked Hong Kong and Singapore failed due to a lack of strong political will. In the end, to succeed the anti-corruption strategy, a corruption control organization with independent authority supported by the strong political will of the supreme ruler is needed. In other words, the strong political will for anti-corruption strategy and practical authority over anti-corruption organizations are the main success factors. As a result, the internal control strategy provided an opportunity to develop from underdeveloped countries to advanced countries.

Ⅴ. The relationship between the strategy of anti-corruption and culture

The causes of corruption in bureaucrats can be divided into moral, institutional, socio-cultural, institutional, systematic approaches. In the moral approach, corruption is closely related to the issues of personal ethics and qualities as a result of personal behavior. It is believed that the fundamental cause of corruption is not due to social and economic factors but human greed and greed(Banfield, 1967). In the socio-cultural approach, the dominant specific customs of personnel culture, such as gift practices, promote corruption. Corruption is a byproduct of the cultural environment and historical customs. Human thinking and behavior are not just social customs, but "socialized habits"(Kluckhohn, 1962). Bureaucratic culture is formed by "the totality of bureaucrats" values and attitudes, which is closely related to civic culture. The phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption is not the full responsibility of bureaucrats which relates to the socio-cultural climate. Consequently, the moral approach and socio-cultural approach can not be suitable in developing countries due to the lack of civic culture.

In the institutional approach, corruption is a defect in social systems and laws. The lack of institutions and laws for administrative control promotes corruption in public officials. From Huntington's point of view, it is pointed out that the cause of corruption in developing countries stems from a political system without institutionalization(Huntington, 1968). In short, corruption is promoted by defects in political and social institutionalization. In an advanced society, institutionalized laws and norms based on constitutionalism are contributing to institutional mechanisms to prevent corruption. The means of external control, which is an institutional device, are institutional devices to prevent corruption.

In a systematic approach, corruption is due to various causes such as institution, culture, structure, and personal behavior. Institutions, cultures, structures, and individual behaviors are interrelated. It is analyzed that institutional reform brings about changes in culture, structure, and individual behavior. At the same time, individual actions can change the structure of institutions and cultures. As a result, this study specifically analyzes the functions and roles of administrative control to prevent corruption in institutional and systemic approaches.

Different historical, social, and cultural factors formed different institutions. It is difficult to say that the same result will be found in other countries just because one country succeeds, so it is dangerous to equalize the system unconditionally. Development strategies can succeed when sound government reform and acceptance are achieved.

Each country′s "culture" is identified as a subjective element in development administration. In other words, while comparative administration characterizes generality and explains democracy as development, it recognizes the cultural relativity of each country and features specificity. Therefore, it is recognized that comparative administration can be developed by following the development process of advanced countries based on modernization theory, but development administration requires different development strategies for each country.

In the view of Fukuyama(2004), organizational and institutional systems are highly transferable in the process of introducing the system of advanced countries for underdeveloped countries, but social and cultural factors are easily not transferable. In other words, organizations and institutions can be easily introduced from advanced countries, but cultural factors are not easily transferable from advanced countries to developing states. At this time, cultural factors refer to the values of the people, including general culture, administrative culture, and political culture. Thus, the introduction of the system is easy, but success depends on the culture of the people′s personalities and values. Accordingly, in the theory of development administration, an appropriate development strategy is needed to recognize the specificities of each country. Culture must be recognized as a unique attribute of each country in the pursuit of anti-corruption strategies.

In the 1950s and 1960s, it is attempted to discover general theories by comparing the administrative systems of developed and underdeveloped countries with different cultural backgrounds along with the interest in comparative development administration theory. The existing comparative administration theory contributed greatly to comparing and analyzing administrative systems and phenomena in the process of national and social development, but the static attitude of the analysis method was insufficient to present effective policies on methods and contents of national strategies for anti-corruption strategy. The theory of development administration is to promote the development of society and the state in economic, social, and cultural areas through administration along with the understanding of the specificity of culture.

To promote the anticorruption strategies, such as Singapore's case, a small number of elites can lead the country's change, along with the emphasis on the active role and function of administration. The theory of development administration emphasizes effective development strategies in developing countries. The development administration theory emphasized the role and function of the administration as a political and administrative principle that does not distinguish between politics and administration. However, the effectiveness emphasized in the development administration theory was criticized for not considering both input and output, focusing on whether the goal was achieved or not. In other words, the concept of democracy is lacking in that it did not reflect opinions through the participation of Congress, the judiciary, the media, and social groups by emphasizing only the role of a strong administration. Consequently, as the characteristics of the developing countries include nationalism, state corporatism, the lack of civil society, and the lack of effective function of the external control in administration control, the adoption of the theory of the New Public Management of neoliberalism for anti-corruption strategy was not successful in the developing countries.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

In anti-corruption strategies, the advanced countries and developing states must undertake various initiatives to eliminate corruption in anti-corruption measures. Developing countries present the absence of a strong and effective external control mechanism to combat corruption, unlike the case of advanced countries. In developing countries, there has been an ineffective and inadequate system of external control in poor democratic conditions and situations such as the critical issue of third world countries. Policies to implement anti-corruption strategies represent different strategies to deal with corruption.

It is noteworthy that in the United States and Europe, anti-corruption strategies are focused on implementation through an efficient external control system. In many cases, there are elements of the perceived success of anti-corruption efforts with the establishment of ethical codes of conduct and laws. It has been claimed that most anti-corruption programs in advanced countries depend on legal and financial

institutions such as the judiciary and financial auditors to intensify accountability in the public sector. The premise is that the application of rules and regulations will reduce corruption.

However, in many poor countries, the legal and financial institutions that manage the external control system are weak and corrupt. In developing countries, where decision-making processes are generally more closed and where "interest aggregation structures are weak" with corruptive political powers and illegal administrative actions. A fundamental cause for the relative failure of anti-corruption strategies is the absence of effective control of the administration in the developing states for creating significant reforms and achieving essential progress through a series of anti-corruption agencies.

Accordingly, in the future direction of research, it will necessary to establish an anti-corruption strategy that can be successfully applied to developing countries by in-depth analysis of the factors and elements of cultural, political, and social differences between developed and developing countries. This study indicates that the function and role of administrative control as a type of internal control for preventing corruption will be effective for the developing countries, while anti-corruption policies are successful in the advanced countries as the functioning of the effective function of external agencies, such as the civil society, mass media, the legislative, etc. Consequently, with the lack of a democratic system unlike the advanced countries, an independent and separate agency is a key requirement for an anti-corruption strategy in the developing countries.

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<Abstract>

Policy and Corruption in the Advanced and Developing Country
- An Analysis of the System of External and Internal Control in Administration Control -

Yun, Eun Gee

The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of policies and strategies to prevent corruption in the advanced and developing countries which is to identify effective anti-corruption strategies in the advanced and developing states. In the function and role of administration control, the advanced and developing countries are pushing for various policies to prevent corruption. Anti-corruption policies in the advanced countries of the USA and UK are recognized as effective anti-corruption strategies with the means of external control, including civil society, legislature, judiciary, interest groups, public opinion, and media. The introduction of the theory of New Public Management in the developing countries was not successful due to the difference of cultural, political, social circumstance. In the developing countries, there is a lack of effective external control mechanisms for anti-corruption strategy, unlike the case of advanced countries. In the developing countries under poor democratic conditions and circumstances, the strategy of internal control rather than external control in administration control to prevent corruption is required in the situation of the absence of the functions and roles of efficient external control systems.

Key words: Corruption, Policy, Administration Control, External Control, Internal Control