

Developmental Administration in Asia: Effects of Bureaucracy and Corruption on Development*

아시아의 발전행정: 발전의 과정에서 부패와 관료의 영향을 중심으로

Yun, Eun Gee(윤은기)**

ABSTRACT

본 논문에서 발전행정론에서 관료의 역할, 부패의 영향, 투명성의 기능의 분석을 통한 부패방지를 위한 대내적·대외적 전략과 정책들의 논의와 함께 한국과 싱가포르의 사례연구는 분석되었다. 본질적으로 합리적인 제도와 효율적인 관료제도는 발전의 원인으로 인식될 수 있고, 관료제도의 이성화는 저개발 국가들에서 본질적인 발전의 전제조건 일 것이다. 좋은 거버넌스의 형태는 발전행정론 에서 국가의 높은 수준의 자율성과 함께 관료의 청렴성과 연관되어 있고, 높은 투명성과 책임성이 강한 국가의 역량은 싱가포르의 사례와 같이 경제·사회적 발전의 과정을 달성하기 위한 필요한 조건이다. 결론적으로, 아시아 국가의 발전과정에서 부패의 방지와 책임성의 증가를 위한 정부의 능력은 발전행정론의 결정적인 요소로 인식될 수 있을 것이다.

주제어 : 거버넌스, 국가 자율성, 관료, 부패, 발전행정

Introduction

Administration, which can determine the process of successful development, is a strategic factor in economic and social development. The inadequacy of administration in many developing countries can be regarded as a major obstacle to the process of development. The research of developmental administration has analyzed the cultural, social, historical factors that complicate the planning and implementation of development. Consequently, the study of developmental administration provides “a catalogue of specific obstacles” in developing countries, which offers theoretical and conceptual background to analyze the causes and interrelations of these obstacles.

Indeed, the essential problem of administration often boils down to a matter of leadership and bureaucracy. Political pressure as the formation of political prestige has influenced appointment and promotion is related to the abuse of political power,

* This work was supported by the Dong-A University research fund.

** Associate professor in the Department of Public Administration, Dong-A University

by accepting bribes and flouting regulations. A breakdown of the rule of law has generated political underdevelopment which often disrupts efficient organization and performance with political corruption.

The characteristic of nepotism, which has undoubtedly impeded the function of effective bureaucracy, may be regarded as the pattern of traditional society in most developing societies. An authoritarian tradition and ideology can undermine the application of administrative principles for public interest. The good governance of administration is likely to produce effective governance that has, in fact, generated social development. The absence of uniform systems of examination, the lack of opportunity for advancement, and the absence of accountability would be a major threat to good governance. Also, an irrational bureaucratic role can be regarded as one of the main obstacles to development. The function of bureaucracy for formulating economic and political goals should resolve political struggle among different interest groups and organizations. The role of administration, which is “an active promoter” of the ultimate goal of economic and social policy, will be significant because of the bureaucracy's crucial role and function on developmental administration in developing countries.

The paper begins with the review of theoretical framework including the bureaucratic role of Weber and Waldo and the methodology of the comparative study for the analysis of developmental administration. The first section discusses the role of bureaucracy, the impact of corruption, transparency and accountability on development. Thus, this section examines the institutional accountability of government for achieving development. The second section explains national and international strategies against corruption. The third section analyzes the case studies of South Korea and Singapore as examples of successful strategies of developmental administration.

Theoretical Background

The universal principle of good administration in public administration is typified by Max Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy. It is at least conceivable that efficient and rational bureaucratic system is conducive to the process of development. The system of rational bureaucracy does certainly not induce corruption, irrationality, and incompetence on views of the appropriateness of the Weberian standard. The bureaucratic machine as “technical specialized functions and

specialized mechanical functions” is “an instrument for the execution of decisions”. Also, Dwight Waldo (1948) has criticized the irrationality of administration as a scientific prescription. Dwight Waldo suggests that the research on development has generated the universal principle of reasonable rule, with combining the insights of the ecological perspective with the dynamism of administrative reform. The doctrine of the comparative administration focuses on governance for development. Waldo concludes that the process of development has requested reasonable decisions in terms of the type and level of rationality.

Riggs recognizes that the Weberian model of bureaucracy as an efficient machine is an inductive model drawn from the experience of Western industrial societies. The role of state in non-Western societies may be crucial for understanding the peculiarities of non-West or developing countries. Scholars construct concepts and models illustrating the essential relationships of state and society. Riggs has explained a new trend in administrative scholarship. The first trend entails a shift from normative to empirical studies for the efficiency of administration. The second trend involves a shift from the reportorial study of unique cases to the quest for generalizations. The third trend is a shift from the non-ecological to the ecological approaches. Consequently, Riggs emphasizes an analysis of the pattern of interaction between subject and environment including culture, history, politics, and social structure. Riggs has developed an experimental methodology for dealing with the many variables of the environment, which has consistently been to apply a set of theoretical models of societies to the comparison of administrative forms.

In the empirical studies of South Korea and Singapore, the role of strong state was significant on the process of economic development. In terms of the lack of rational civil society, the role of state was crucial. Insofar as the role of governmental institutions is to implement efficient administration, developing countries had achieved economic development without some of the independent political and interest group, like the case of South Korea and Singapore. In Singapore, the bureaucracy was not controlled by private associations, economic interest groups, and independent political parties. The doctrine of developmental administration, which stresses a functional bureaucracy, can be provided by the high level of the autonomy of state. The authoritarian regimes of civilian or military may or may not be able to mobilize their societies for development. However, effective administration requires the separation of the administrative capacities from the political process.

Often obstacles to the development of efficient administration comes from political, social, and cultural forces of society. As comparative studies of administration focus on the interdisciplinary studies of economy, politics, history, sociology, the scholarship of developmental administration has largely emphasized the role and function of leadership and bureaucracy as opposed to the function of democratic pluralism. The doctrines of administration in developing countries were seen to be radically different from those in industrialized Western countries. In other words, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of public administration was needed; for this goal, scholars have synthesized political science, economics, history, sociology, psychology, and anthropology. In the study of comparative public administration, differences in political, economic, social and cultural environment are examined. For example, other cultural values including individualism and collectivism have affected different administrative system involving centralization and decentralization. The research in terms of “an ecology of public administration” as a study of the interrelation of administration and environment would be necessary such as the experimental methodology of Riggs.

Development

The cause of underdevelopment stems from political, social, cultural problem. It is often argued that corruption causes underdevelopment. Developing countries are facing such problems such as social conflict, illicit activity, and instability. The process of democratization has, by and large, generated transparency and accountability in government. This study shows the analysis of the role of bureaucracy and the impact of corruption on the development.

1. The Role of Bureaucracy on Development

The function of bureaucracy is significant to bring about the process of development. The pernicious influences of corruption are a complex phenomenon. Corruption can be limited by the implementation of the rule of law and the transparency of public sector. The governmental institutions without accountability have generated the high level of corruption and political instability in developing countries. The rule of law with transparency and accountability, which can be regarded as a good government, is necessary to induce development in Asia. The

lack of the rule of law and the absence of transparency has induced the high level of corruption. On the other hand, with the role of media for increasing the opportunities of transparency and integrity, communication technologies are contributing a diffusion of anti-corruption strategies.

A simple definition of bad governance is “the abuse of public power for private gain” (World Bank, 1997:102). The definitions of corruption can be explained by three types: public-office centered, market-centered or public-interest centered (A.J Heidenheimer, 1989: 8–11). In this way, political officials commit a violation of duty by means of bribery. In the executive branch of government, the most common picture of corruption would be the behaviors of public officials accepting or soliciting a bribe. Bribery, kick-backs, expensive gifts, etc. is at the center of “grand corruption” such as the privatization of large state assets and “petty corruption” such as routine speed money or small bribes, etc. In addition to the public financial domain, corrupt acts are practiced within the administrative domains, which include behavior such as nepotism and cronyism based on a spoils system, resulting from a pervasive politicization of the bureaucracy and collection of unauthorized fees. Thus, the bureaucracy becomes an instrument for propagating the political interests of the leadership, which is at odds with the public interest. Corrupt administrative practices emerge at the interface of the political leadership. Also, corruption is particularly pernicious in the judiciary which upholds the rule of law. In such situations, judges are pressured to reach verdicts not based on justice but on political expediencies. Consequently, the corruptive acts have induced the incapacity of bureaucracy’s role and function for underdevelopment.

2. The Impact of Corruption on Development

There are the costs and benefits of corruption on the process of development. Samuel Huntington saw corruption as a necessary stage in the modernization process -- including a change in the basic values of a society, the differentiation between public role and private interests, and a proliferation of laws -- which increase opportunities for corruption (Samuel P. Huntington, 1997). Nathaniel Leff (1964) defines that corruption is “an extralegal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy”. It seems that the effects of corruption may be either “utilitarian or detrimental” in the underdeveloped countries.

However, the study of cross-country comparisons shows that corruption has

induced the negative effect in terms of economic growth. Regression analysis shows that a country that improves its standing on the corruption index from 6 to 8 (0 being the most corrupt, 10 the least) will experience a 4 percentage point increase in its investment rate and a 0.5 percentage point increase in its annual per capita GDP growth rate” (Mauro, 1998:12). In fact, this analysis shows that corrupt governments spend less on the investment for public interest including education and health (Mauro, 1998). Usually, domestic and foreign investors would like to invest their capitals and resources in countries that are politically stable and economically predictable. There is striking evidence that the effective investment of capital with the lower level of corruption would be important for promoting economic growth. Consequently, corruption leads to the decline of economic growth and social development because of “deterred private investment”.

The rule of law is the cornerstone of institutional democracy. The state has exercised the rule of law with the mechanism of checks and balances as a pattern of good governance. The divided function and role of the legislature for making law, the executive for executing law, and the judiciary for interpreting law prevents corruption in advanced countries. However, bureaucrats in government can abuse their authorities to seek self-interest in many developing countries. In fact, even if there is a process of the rapid decentralization of power by shifting from central planning economy to market system, the mechanism of checks and balances is often not properly and effectively operating despite the separations of powers in the underdeveloped countries. It is acknowledged that the underdeveloped countries have been epitomized by ineffective political system and structure. These countries have been associated with cults of personality and deep-rooted corruption that have hindered economic growth. These phenomena can be regarded as the sort of “grand corruption” that results from an ineffective role of government for personal enrichment and interest.

3. Transparency and Accountability on Development

The rule of law, transparency and accountability in the public sector affect not only the economic development but also play a critical role in the governance of a nation. The rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the public sector have been used to combat corruption in advanced countries. Also, it is well known that citizens have recognized the role of government for the public interest in order to effectively implement democracy. To a certain extent, the principal of the rule of

law is certainly associated with the notion of transparency and accountability in the advanced countries.

Transparency in government is to protect the individual right of citizens and to encourage individual economic activity through offering reliable information to people about decision-making processes. Fair competition in market-based system can be regarded as an integral part of democracy. The accountability of government is crucial to obtain the confidence of citizens. Also, mismanagement and corruption of public officials can, to a great extent, be restricted by the principle of transparency and accountability. Impediments to transparency and accountability in government in developing countries are excessive, arcane and outdated regulations that make it hard to understand the processes of decision-making and the criteria for decisions. In addition, broad discretion concentrated in the hands of individuals or small groups without accountability constitutes the right formula for breeding corruption (Klitgaard, 1988).

Corruption can be increased by “a lack of resources” or “a lack of political will” which has generated impediments to transparency and accountability for preventing corruption. Corruption induces the decline of trust and credibility. The process of economic growth with the policy of effective investment can substantially be achieved by the successful implementation of transparency and accountability. It has been a preferred economic policy instrument in developing countries for the process of privatization on the globalization. Ultimately, the process of privatization, in order to improve the economic performance, requires the reduction of corruption.

For example, when the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries had propelled a transition from central planned economy to the process of privatization, the level of corruption had steadily increased (Daniel Kaufmann and Paul Siegelbaum, 1997). When market systems were adopted, the lack of market-based effective financial systems and ineffective legal systems resulted in a lack of transparency and accountability in the process of rapid privatizations, generating grand corruption through “spontaneous privatization” and “stealing from the state”.

The level of administrative discretion without accountability can induce the illegal corrupt behavior of transactions, and the absence of the independent agencies of government to curb corruption has brought about the lack of transparency and accountability. The divestment of state assets in favor of personal interests led to the massive diversion of public funds. It can be argued that accountability and

transparency is essentially necessary for performing the effective operation of market system.

There is a strong correlation between the level of corruption and the weakening of the lawful state and its institutions, along with the violation of individual rights; laws and regulations, along with adequate oversight and enforcement, can deter fraud and corruption (Borge, 1999). The role of government in Preventing and Detecting Fraud and Corruption is imperative. For example, independent SAIs (State Audit Institutions) can encourage the selection of public servants exclusively according to their integrity and capability. The SAIs can and should endeavor to create an environment that is unfavorable to fraud and corruption. Independent SAIs, which have adequate mandates, can effectively contribute to the fight against fraud and corruption. Accordingly, SAIs should 1) seek an adequate level of financial and operative independence and breadth of audit coverage; 2) take a more active role in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of financial and internal control systems; 3) focus audit strategy on areas and operations prone to fraud and corruption by developing effective high risk indicators for fraud; 4) produce understandable and relevant audit reports; 5) encourage the establishment of personnel management procedures for the public service that selects, retains, and motivates competent employees; 6) encourage the establishment of guidance for financial disclosure; 7) consider a closer cooperation and appropriate exchange of information with other national and international bodies fighting corruption (Borge, 1999).

National and International Strategies against Corruption

In a globalizing world, the strategies to prevent, detect and punish corrupt acts must be formulated at both the national and international levels. Institutions and actors must be invoked in the fight against corruption. Also, with action and cooperation at the international level, it is to build the effectual capacity of the institutions of public sector so as to uphold the rule of law and increase transparency.

1. National Strategies

At the national level, active role for civil society is essential. Civil society has

been defined as “the realm of organized social life” that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting with a legal order or set of rules (Larry Diamond, 1994). Civil society can serve as a countervailing force to either an overbearing or an unraveling state in the fight against corruption. Civil society organizations can watch over government activities and educate the populace of its civic and political rights. The private sector, which is both a perpetrator and a victim of corruption, must also be engaged in the fight against corruption.

The network of communications would be important in public policy. In an advanced country, the communication between population and government can effectively be performed by the function of mass media. When citizen is inarticulate, the administration shows a virtual absence of communication between government and population which has hindered a social integration. Also, by the influence of outside groups which are “the autonomous political bodies (legislative, courts, parties)” that direct and punish the implementers of policy, the administration is able to focus on administration rather than politics. The pressures and motivations in terms of bureaucratic action can be provided by the influence of outside groups. Many advanced countries seek to formulate social policy through tripartite collaboration between government, employers, and labor.

However, the weakness or absence of autonomous power centres (parties or interest groups) is the source of the feebleness of formal legislative institutions in many developing countries. In its tendencies of laziness, insensitivity, procedural ritualism, and so forth, political system will be incapable of shaping the collective behavior of the population. In developing societies and countries, where interest groups and organizations are non-existent or weak, the expansion of ethical administrative function is essential for delivering development, which would be the major cause of economic growth.

The modern industrialized society has a wide range of social institutions, such as political parties, legislatures, administrative offices, courts, trade unions, markets, banks, churches and schools. The input functions in Almond's political system are interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, and political socialization and recruitment. The output functions are rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication. The output functions correspond to the three branches of government including legislative, executive, and judiciary. Also, it is necessary to induce the development of key institutions for preventing corruption. The institutions include the executive, judiciary, enforcement agencies, media, watchdog agencies, and parliament, which affect the spheres of rule of law, sustainable

development and national capacity.

The system is aimed at promoting transparency in administrative procedures and accountability by eliminating the possibility of corruption through direct public scrutiny and supervision. Through integrated anti-corruption organizations and institutions, the effective developmental administration can be achieved by the function of institution based on the virtues of good morale, conduct and social practices in a long-term perspective. The impact of corruption would be “a serious erosion of the rule of law” on governance. Corruption is attributed to the greed of individual interest, which has generated a vicious circle of increasing the level of corruption and declining the capacity of state for development.

2. International Strategies

Several international organizations have provided to offer effective strategies for development at the national level. The OECD has developed the concept of the public service of “ethics infrastructure” for the executive branch of government which include the following eight elements: political commitment, a legal framework, accountability mechanisms, codes or conduct or statements of values, professional socialization, employment conditions, ethics, coordinating bodies, and public involvement and scrutiny which serve the three functions of guidance, management and control in the public service (OECD, 1996). The OECD “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” was adopted in November 1997 and came into force in February 1999. The success of these measures is being monitored by an OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (Stephen J. H. Dearden, 2000). The international institutions are collaborating for “anti-money laundering legislation and procedures”.

There are a number of international legal instruments. The Council of Europe has adopted the *Criminal Law Convention on Corruption* in 1998 and the *Civil Law Convention on Corruption* in 1999. The European Union adopted a number of legal instruments in 1995, aiming to protect the European Communities’ financial interests by criminalizing fraudulent conduct. The *Inter-American Convention against Corruption* of the Organization for American States entered into force in 1997. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development adopted the *Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions* in 1997, and it went into force in 1999. The United Nations is in the process of

negotiating a *Convention against Corruption* which is to be completed in 2003. These implemented legal instruments will enhance the rule of law in fighting corruption in both the public and private sectors.

The World Bank has stressed that the prevention of corruption is an issue of developmental strategy. The effective strategies are as follows: 1) banks require collective and coordinated action at the international level for preventing fraud and corruption with “the improvement of procurement and financial management policies”. 2) It is necessary “strengthened international responses and strategies” to reduce corruption with the development of “specialized staff capability”. 3) It is required to strengthen the rule of law for operating transparency and accountability. 4) “Formulating effective remedial strategies” to eliminate corruption by governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (Dearden, 2000).

The international institutions, which support a number of global, regional and national anti-corruption projects, can provide “the requisite integrity, efficiency and effectiveness in their criminal justice systems” to curb corruption through sound public administration and governance institutions. The international institutions and organizations have, to a great extent, attempted to encourage the incentives for efficient administration. As a result, by building the capacity of public sector institutions, including for endorsing the rule of law and fostering transparency and accountability, it will increase the state’s capacity for promoting development.

Case Study: South Korea and Singapore

The corporatist political arrangement of South Korea and Singapore have provided the basis for market guidance; the governments have guided market forces by: (1) redistributing agricultural land in the early postwar period; (2) controlling the financial system and making private financial capital subordinate to industrial capital; (3) maintaining stability in some of the main economic parameters that affect the viability of long-term investment, especially the exchange rate, the interest rate, and the general price level; (4) modulating the impact of foreign competition in the domestic economy; (5) promoting exports; (6) promoting technology acquisition from multinational companies and building a national technology system; and (7) assisting particular industries (Wade, 1990:27–28; see also Yun, 2011: 171–172).

In the case of South Korea, state corporatism had contributed to the process of

economic growth based on the function and role of strong bureaucracy, which may be regarded as a type of developmental administration. A bureaucratic authoritarian system is a strategy of developmental administration based on a high level of state autonomy, which includes the rule of hierarchy without the separation of institutional power. The bureaucracy had dominated the policy-making process which was described as authoritarian system, while the state apparatus in democratic pluralism had been occupied by social democratic coalitions including government, company, and labor union (Chang, 2003:64; see also Yun, 2011: 171). The different types of capitalism have induced different administrative system including state corporatism, social corporatism, and pluralism. It may be necessary to ensure that the autonomy of state for achieving economic development would essentially be crucial and the models of growth theory may be explained by the autonomic theory of state (Yun, 2011).

Professionalism in Korean public administration would be useful to attain the economic development. During the 1950s and 1960s, as one of the most urgent tasks for development policy, the Korean government actively created a pool of competent professionals to manage all aspects of government functions. Accordingly, public servants, military officers, and student were sent to Western countries, many of them to the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, for short-term training as Development (AID), the United Nations, and foundations (Jun 1991:201). These people learned the techniques and scientific knowledge of Western societies that have undoubtedly contributed to the expansion of professionalism in Korean public bureaucracies: 1) the most dramatic change in the background of public employees is the level of education among higher civil servants¹⁾, 2) the training of the military personnel overseas was part of a professionalization phenomenon that indirectly influenced the promotion of efficient administration in the public sector²⁾, 3) between 1950 and 1986, 21,530 public employees and civilians were sent to approximately 20 countries under the sponsorship of various international organizations such as AID, UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, IBRD, and others; 4) Between 1977 and 1987, a total of 1,612 higher civil servants, including faculty from

1) In 1958 only 15.3% of the lower middle-management people known as Samookwan had completed 4 years of college, and by 1983, 70% of bureaucrats at the equivalent management level held bachelor's degrees and nearly one-third of these had either earned graduated degrees or were pursuing graduate level education (Jun 1991:201).

2) With new technical knowledge that military officers gained overseas, the Ministry of Defense has attempted to apply rational techniques to improve the functions of budgeting systems, planning rational techniques to improve the functions of budgeting systems, planning and control, accounting, auditing, and management (Jun 1991:201).

government training institutes, were sent overseas with funding from the national treasury; These programs have focused largely on three categories : (a) general administration, (b) special administration and policy studies, and (c) technical administration such as tourism, telecommunication, computer science, agricultural, and fishery technology; 5) between 1977 and 1983, 90.5% (347 people) of long-term trainees were sent to English-speaking countries, while only 9.5% went to non-English-speaking countries, but since the beginning of 1988, the distribution between English-speaking countries and non-English-speaking countries has been equally divided; 6) the rapid growth of graduate degree programs in public administration has greatly contributed to the development of professional administrators with formal education in general public administration, which are 33 master's degree programs and 26 doctoral programs in Korea (Jun 1991:201-202). Consequently, the growth of competent professional administrators and experts had led to the process of economic and social development which may, as a matter of fact, be achieved by the substantive knowledge and ethical accountability of bureaucrats.

The Korean bureaucracy has intensely influenced the establishment of developmental alliance for the purposes of economic development, "starting with the nationalist and state-led model of the 1960s and the gradual rise of neoliberal thought from the 1980s"; the bureaucracy has acted as "an interface between the state and the *Chaebols* during the Park era", which may be a developmental alliance between the state and the private sector of business (Hundt, 2009). It must be noted that the role of bureaucracy was essential to the process of economic development.

State has strong influence for promoting economic growth in terms of the policy of government in developing countries. The effective role of bureaucracy had resulted in an enhancement of the increase of state's capacity in the public sector about the decision-making process in South Korea. The net effect of government decisions and activities had contributed to induce the rapid economic growth in 1970s and 1980s. There had been an expansion of efficient services in policy formulation and implementation of the central governments for economic development. The effective role and function of bureaucracy in Korea was crucial in the process of economic development, which can be regarded as the strategy of developmental administration.

In case of Singapore, the role of the leadership would be crucial to attain the economic and social development with the political function of People's Action Party

(PAP) based on an application of the principles of developmental administration which could be the application of the administrative values of effectiveness and efficiency, justice, and morality, and Lee's leading ideology of 'Asian values' which have underlined the role of strong state is a form of ruling doctrine, seen as creating the society of anti-corruption (Yun, 2010).

As Yun (2010) has indicated, the city-state's model of the strong state of Singapore has been constructed by the leadership of Lee. To a certain extent, the city-state's founding father continued to hold a great deal of influence on the country's policies (Zakaria, 1994:110). It may be maintained that Singapore's values in policy have, as a whole, included effectiveness, efficiency, integrity, liberal conservatism and public spirit. There has, as a matter of fact, been a basic distinction between Western concepts and East Asian concepts in terms of the doctrine of democracy, and Lee has publicly supported a view of Confucianism as an Asian tradition with the acceptance of an authoritarian rule (Sen, 1997). The important features of Confucian beliefs, which are communitarian values, have been the importance of society and the need for a competent bureaucracy (Bell, 1997). Lee Kuan Yew's leadership had performed the strategy of developmental administration as Singapore's leading doctrine to achieve the national goal for development.

As Yun(2010) has argued, it has intentionally nurtured the dependency of its citizens in its welfare systems, ranging from state-controlled housing to compulsory pension plans, which place about 40 percent of total labor earnings into the hands of government managers (Lingle, 1996). Lee's implementation of a plan for industrial development and economic changes in the country was met with relative support, based on the fact that the plan addressed some of the basic concerns of the general population, including the need for economic changes, the need for jobs and the problems of education and housing (George, 1973:100-6). Singapore's transformation from a poor third world country in 1959 to an affluent first world country in 2000 has legitimized the PAP government and contributed to its durability in Singapore politics (Quah, 2010:22).

As Yun (2010) has described, the PAP not only controls the Army, the Judiciary, the Union Movement and the Police Force (Buchanan, 1972). Between 1968 and October 1981, in four national parliamentary elections, the PAP won every seat, and the December 1980 general elections witnessed a PAP win in all 75 parliamentary seats and 75.5 per cent of ballots cast in those 38 constituencies where opposition candidates ran (Bellows, 1985:56).

The governance of Singapore has generated the formation of strong state through the strategy of developmental administration with promoting the republican patriotism in Singapore. Yun (2010) has argued that Singapore can be seen as the foundations of administrative state which may be seen as a formation of state corporatism with the reciprocal relations between government and citizen. Singapore's governance notion is not the individual liberty of the citizens but "a community of solidarity", which is to perform public good and interest by the principle of accountability, integrity, and anti-corruption. A political conflict would be obstacle to the function and role of autonomous state which has substantially induced the strategy of developmental administration in order to achieve the process of economic development for the common good. The formation of good governance would be a strategy for the interest of whole citizens with the high level of state's autonomy and society's support, which is accountability and integrity in the role of government as justice and morality for encouraging public interest. The 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows that Singapore scored 87 out of 100 and ranked 5th among 174 countries. It is certainly acknowledged that Singapore is perceived as very clean country.

As Yun (2010) has explained, the political value of policy would essentially be a distributive justice with the enforcement of law which is required to prevent bureaucratic corruptibility. The doctrine of ethical governance is associational notion rather than political one mentioned by John Rawls which means the norm of friendship, trust, faith, charity, and humanity in society. Singapore's limited democracy may not fully conform to accepted democratic norms and values, but it is difficult to deny that the system has worked extremely well and has produced remarkable national development (Vasil, 2000:249; see also Yun, 2010). The political governance in Singapore had contributed to "economic development, social prosperity, and ethnic cooperation" for inducing social development. A sense of community, strong ethical values, and social solidarity, which are associated with the doctrine of successful developmental administration, have been cultivated by the governance of Singapore. The value of policy can be seen to consist of inner moral strength, magnanimity, vitality, generosity, public spirit, civic sense, which is to establish the moral community society under the higher autonomy of state and to perform common interest for social development under the strategy of developmental administration.

Conclusion

Bad governance can result in substantial barriers to modernization. Plans may fail to be implemented because the irrational institutions or patterns are incompatible with good governance. The private motivation of individuals in the administration is likely to be inconsistent with national goals. Most developing countries are characterized by the coexistence of traditional and modern forms as a result of incomplete and uneven social change. It is the coexistence of the traditional and modern governance that produces the seemingly paradoxical traits between traditional administration and new public management (NPM). Different types and levels of cultures are to introduce 'relativity'. Economic development can come either through the emergence of democratic pluralistic politics or through an authoritarian leadership committed to economic development. It should be noted that the study of developmental administration is to examine the cultural and social factors for development in developing societies.

It would be a mistake to assume that the process of decentralization is a total solution for generating development. There is no simple answer in terms of the recurrent question of centralization or decentralization in the literature of development. The research methodology of developmental administration analyzes "the interrelation of administration and environment" due to cultural incompatibility. Ineffective political system, "procedural ritualization", and "internal bureaucratic divisiveness" have required major administrative reform. In fact, a weak bureaucracy is a cause of underdevelopment and the rationalization of bureaucratic polity is a precondition of development.

The respect for public spirit, accountability, and transparency can be considered as fundamental factors of development. "Democracy based upon the rule of law and accountable governance" is an essential part of development. The formation of good governance can be regarded as "the transparent and accountable management" of economic and social resources for attaining sustainable development with the function of the high autonomy of state as the doctrine of developmental administration. It is to strengthen "transparent and accountable institutions" for promoting good governance in the process of substantial development such as the case of Singapore. To put it concretely, the capacity of state for combating corruption and enhancing the effective role of bureaucracy is a precondition for achieving a successful strategy of developmental administration.

References

- Bell, D. (1997). 'A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism: The Case of Singapore'. *Political Theory* 25:1.
- Bellows, Thomas J. (1985). Bureaucracy and Development In Singapore, *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 7(1):55–69.
- Borge, Magnus. (1999). The Role of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in Combating Corruption, 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, 10–15 October 1999, Durban, South Africa.
- Buchanan, I. (1972). *Singapore in Southeast Asia*. London: Bell.
- Chang, Ha-Joon (2003). *Globalisation, Economic Development and the Role of the State*. London and New York: Zed Nooks Ltd.
- Cooper, Phillip J. and Newland, Chester A. (1997). (eds) *Handbook of Public Law and Administration*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Daniel, Kaufmann and Paul Siegelbaum. (1997). "Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies." *Journal of International Affairs* 50(2): 519–58.
- Dearden, Stephen J. H. (2000). Corruption and Economic Development . *DSA European Development Policy Study Discussion Paper* No. 18.
- Fons, Jerome S. (1998). *Improving Transparency in Asian Banking Systems*. Chicago: A version of paper presented at a conference on Asia: *An Analysis of Financial Crisis*, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the International Monetary Fund, 9 October.
- George, T. (1973), *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore*. London: Andre Deutsch.
- Hwang, Kelley K. (1996). "South Korea's Bureaucracy and the Informal Politics of Economic Development." *Asian Survey* 36: 306–319.
- Heidenheimer, A. J. (1989). "Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption", in Heidenheimer, Arnold J.; Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (eds.). 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
- Heidenheimer, A. J. (1989). "Terms, Concepts, and Definitions: An Introduction", in Heidenheimer, Arnold J.; Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (eds.). 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold J.; Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (eds.). 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
- Hundt, David (2009). *Korea's Developmental Alliance: State, Capital and the Politics of Rapid Development*. New York: Routledge.
- J.S.N. Nye, op. cit., and Susan Rose-Ackerman. (1999). *Corruption and Government:*

- Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Jun, Jong S. (1991). "Enhancing Professional Roles and Ethical Responsibility: A Means for Creating Democratic Administration in Korea," edited by Ali Farazmand, *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc
- Klitgaard, Robert. (1988). *Controlling Corruption* Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
- Larry Diamond. (1994). "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 5:3.
- Leff, Nathaniel. (1964). "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption." *American Behavioral Scientist*, pp. 8-14.
- Lingle, C. (1996), *Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism*. Fairfax: The Locke Institute.
- Mauro, Paolo. (1997). "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross Country Analysis." pp. 83-107 in Kimberly A. Elliot (ed.), *Corruption and the Global Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Mauro, Paolo. (1998). "Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research." *Finance and Development*. Vol. 35, No. 1:11-14.
- _____. (2002). "The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure." Selection 20 (pp. 339-352) in Heidenheimer, Arnold J., and Michael Johnston (eds.). *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts* (3d ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1996). *Public Service Ethics: Current Issues and Practice*, Occasional Paper 14. Paris: OECD.
- Quah, Jon S. T.(2010), *Public Administration Singapore-Style*, London: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1998). "Corruption and the Global Economy" in United Nations Programme Development, *Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries*. New York: UNDP.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1999). *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Samuel P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption", in Heidenheimer, Arnold J.; Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (eds.). 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
- Sen, A. (1997), "Human Rights and Asian Values". *The New Republic* (July 14 & 21).
- Vasil, Taj. (2000). *Governing Singapore: Democracy and National Development*, Sydney: Alllen and Unwin.
- Wade, Robert (1990). *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- World Bank. (1997). *World Development Report 1997*. Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press.
- Yun, Eun Gee. (2011). The Democratic Governance of Trust and Developmental Administration, *Korean Corruption Studies Review*. Vol. 16:3.
- Yun, Eun Gee. (2010). The Origin of Traditional Administration in Plato's Thought: The Focus of the Case of Singapore. *Korean Corruption Studies Review*. Vol. 15:4.
- Zakaria, F. (1994), "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew". *Foreign Affairs* 73:2.

투고일자 : 2013. 05. 21

수정일자 : 2013. 09. 17

게재일자 : 2013. 09. 23

Abstract

Developmental Administration in Asia: Effects of Bureaucracy and Corruption on Development

Yun, Eun Gee (Dong-A University)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the role of bureaucracy, the impact of corruption, and the function of transparency on developmental administration. This paper examines national and international strategies against corruption. Also, it focuses on the case studies of South Korea and Singapore as examples of effective strategies of developmental administration. Rational institutions and effective bureaucracy can be a cause of development. The rationalization of bureaucratic polity will essentially be a precondition of development in developing countries. The formation of good governance is associated with the rational role of bureaucracy, integrity, accountability and transparency with the function of the high autonomy of state as the doctrine of developmental administration. The capacity of strong state as “transparent and accountable institutions” was required for attaining substantial levels of development such as in the case of Singapore. To put it concretely, the capability of state for combating corruption and enhancing bureaucratic accountability on the process is crucial for successful developmental administration.

Key Words: Autonomy, Bureaucracy, Corruption, Developmental Administration, Governance