

Analysis on Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire towards Breaking with Systemic Corruption: Focusing on the Theory of Rothstein and Teorell

제도적 부패 근절을 위한 세네갈과 코트디부아르의 반부패 이니셔티브
분석: Rothstein과 Teorell의 이론을 중심으로

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국문초록

세계은행에 따르면 전 세계적으로 부패로 인한 연간 비용이 글로벌 GDP의 약 5%에 해당하며, 취약국들에서 부패 문제가 가장 심각하다. 부패 근절의 중요성과 시급성에도 불구하고 취약국들 중 부패인식지수(CPI)를 향상하고 있는 나라를 찾아보기 힘들다. 이러한 실정에서 아프리카의 세네갈과 코트디부아르는 예외적 성과를 보이고 있다. 두 나라의 정치 지도자들은 반부패 이니셔티브의 가치를 올리고 비교적 단기간에 주목할 만한 발전을 거두었다. 본 연구는 제도적 부패에 관한 Rothstein과 Teorell의 이론을 중심으로 세네갈과 코트디부아르의 현 대통령들이 취임 이후 주창했던 반부패 이니셔티브들을 분석한다. 분석 결과 양국이 상당히 유사한 양상을 보이나 분석틀의 각 요소에서 성과의 차이가 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한 두 나라의 노력에도 불구하고, 공정하고 독립적인 사법부를 보장하고 제도적 부패를 타파하기 위해서는 여전히 많은 과제가 남아있음을 확인할 수 있었다.

주제어: 반부패 이니셔티브, 세네갈, 코트디부아르, 제도적 부패, Rothstein and Teorell

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I. Introduction

The World Bank estimates that the annual cost of global corruption equals roughly 5% of global GDP, equal to the amount of US\$2.6 trillion (CleanGovBiz, 2014). Although various degrees of corruption prevail in all parts of the world, the problem is most severe in fragile states and affects the marginalized groups in those countries by reducing their access to basic needs, such as healthcare, education and justice. According to projections by the OECD, more than two billion people will live in fragile states by 2030 (OECD, 2018). Despite the importance and urgency of fighting corruption, few of the fragile states are improving in terms of their Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and new figures shows that a majority of the citizens in Africa think that corruption is getting worse in their countries (Transparency International, 2019a).

Despite the fact that many of the corruption measures are showing a negative reality, some countries are striving in the opposite direction and have significantly improved their CPI-scores consistently over the last couple of years. Two of these improving countries are the African states Senegal, that improved their CPI from 36 to 45 between 2012 and 2018, and Côte d'Ivoire that have managed to amend their CPI from 27 to 36 during 2013 to 2017 (Transparency International, "Sub-Saharan Africa" 2019b). This study aims to evaluate where these improvements originate from and analyse if the countries are on their way to break with systemic corruption and thereby making a rare transition achieved by 25 countries before them. The study will use the theory of Teorell and Rothstein (2015).

Research Question: Are Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire on their way to break with systemic corruption, and what further initiatives are needed to ensure their success?

Given the high costs of corruption and the difficulty for a country to break with systemic corruption, much is at stake for both countries. Analysing whether the enacted changes in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire will be able to liberate the countries from the chuckles of corruption, or if additional actions are needed to utilize the rarely given momentum are of utmost importance to ensure that the two countries are not

falling back into another negative spiral of increased corruption.

II. Corruption, Systemic Corruption, and State Fragility

There is a large volume of existing literature on the concept of corruption. However, Morris (2011) argues that despite the widespread problem of corruption, a legal definition of the concept is still unsettled. According to the author, corruption can refer to a broad range of behaviours and there are various ways to categorize it. He goes on to say that one way to do this is to focus on the broader context in which corruption thrives by separating between incidental, institutional and systemic corruption (Morris, 2011). Having said that, this study focuses on the most significant type – “systemic” corruption as a context in which corruption is deeply pervasive and entrenched in society, contrary to incidental or institutional corruption which means that corruption is limited to certain institutions or individuals (Morris, 2011).

When analysing the impact of corruption on state fragility, much literature is focusing on the impact on economic growth, and generally corruption is considered to be a strong constraint on growth. On the other hand, some authors display different and somewhat conflicting results on the effects of corruption on economic growth. For instance, on the one hand, Park (2001) shows that a 1% increase in corruption level negatively impacts the economic growth rate by approximately 0,7%, pointing to the effect of corruption on political instability as the main reason to this negative effect. Mauro (1995) also suggests that corruption negatively impacts growth, primarily by negatively impacting the level of investment in the country. Similar negative correlation between growth and corruption is presented by Rose-Ackerman (1997). More recently, Gründler and Potrafke (2019) illustrates the same result, using up-to-date data.

In contrast, by separating between developed and developing countries, Meon and Weill (2010) finds that in countries with weak institutions, corruption is less detrimental to growth, and argues that in the case of extremely weak institutions, corruption may even positively contribute to growth and efficiency by enabling actors to overcome various inefficiency's and bureaucratic constraints. Another field of literature relating to corruption and fragility explores the effect of corruption on the

country's ability to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Zurawicki & Habib (2002) shows that corruption is a considerable obstacle for attracting FDI as the reasons underlying their finding might be the perceived practical issues of dealing with corrupt states and the moral dilemma of doing so. In the same vein, Sadig (2009) shows that a 1% increase in the level of corruption decreases the inflow of FDI per capita with approximately 11%.

Systemic corruption issues are indeed critical in fragile states and it tends to affect the most marginalized groups in society. How the dynamics of systemic corruption have devastating effects on the vulnerable people in a country? Let us look at how the health care sector in Ukraine worked under former president Viktor Yanukovich. During the period for which Yanukovich held office in Ukraine, systemic corruption thrived and was pervasive in all levels of the public administration, and the healthcare sector was no exception. The systemic corruption started at the top of the pyramid where high-level officials made beneficial personal arrangements with private sector companies to overpay for various medications in the exchange for personal gains.

As a result, the amount of medication that the Ukrainian healthcare-budget could support decreased sharply and the patients in need of the medication were the ones suffering. At the lowest level, to even be able to get the treatment they needed in the publicly operated hospitals, patients needed to bribe the doctors in order to avoid being dismissed. Systemic corruption implies that all levels of the pyramid, all the way down to the patients in need, have to engage with corruption and pay bribes upwards in order to get what they want from their superior. Since everyone in the system is part of the systemic corruption scheme, it gets extremely hard for anyone to put an end to it (Bullough, 2019).

III. Corruption and Anti-Corruption Measures in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

1. Senegal

Senegal was under French colonial rule for more than a century before becoming an independent state in 1960. Like the case with Côte d'Ivoire, the French colonial rule

has left many traces in modern Senegal and many French companies play a big role in some of the country's main sectors, such as providing vital infrastructure services.

Since its independence from France, the situation in Senegal has been relatively stable. According to Transparency International, Senegal's relative success in various corruption indices, such as the CPI, compared to other west-African countries can to a large extent be explained by the country's post-independent tradition of democracy and respect for the rule of law (Shipley, 2018a). Despite the country's one party rule during the 18 years following the independence, a political transformation towards a fully liberalised democracy was initiated in 1978 when two additional parties were allowed in the elections.

Three years later in 1981, restrictions on the number of parties allowed in the elections were removed (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018a) and in the same year, Abdou Diouf became president of Senegal. Diouf ruled the country during the following two decades. However, following a period of economic turbulence originating from falling commodity prices in the early 90's and repeated allegations of electoral fraud and of restricting the democratic rule in Senegal, Diouf lost the 2000 election to Abdoulaye Wade. Among Wade's election pledges were the promise of improvements of governance in Senegal and various initiatives to assure long-term continuing of democracy in the country (Shipley, 2018a).

Unfortunately, Wade failed to live up to his promises and continuously abused his power throughout his term in office by e.g. setting aside the country's prime ministers as they became too popular or powerful. Furthermore, during his term in office, nepotism grew within the public administration and controversies regarding the abuse of public funds by President Wade gained ever increasing attention (Freedom House, 2012). In 2012, Wade further defied the Senegalese constitution by running for a third term in office, which was approved by a dubitable ruling by the Senegalese Constitutional Court leading to protests and violence between demonstrators and the police (Freedom House, 2013). During the latter part with the Wade administration in office, Senegal experienced a sharp decline in CPI and a growing concern regarding corruption within the public administration arose. Wade subsequently lost the 2012 elections to the current president Macky Sall, who campaigned with the pledge to curb the increasing corruption in the country.

Even though Senegal is only one out of eight African countries with a CPI-score above 43, relatively little literature exists on Senegalese corruption and anti-corruption

measures and they merely deal with partial aspects of the problem. For instance, Inman and Andrews (2015) looks at the perception of corruption in Senegal and its effect on political participation and O'Brien (2008) focuses solely on corruption in the Senegalese private security sector, where corruption is shown to be deeply entrenched and widespread.

2. Côte d'Ivoire

Like Senegal, French colonial rule was established in the west-African state Côte d'Ivoire during the 1880's in what is now often being referred to as the scramble for Africa. The long-span period under colonial rule has later on proven to have had a significant impact on the country's development as an independent nation, especially with regards to how leaders are leading their country. After have being under French influence for over a century, Cote d'Ivoire became independent in 1960. In the post-independence period, the country was led by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and in the following decades, Côte d'Ivoire successfully embraced a liberal economic system and economically the country turned into a regional powerhouse. The economic success was much thanks to the heavy exports of some of the country's commodities, such as cocoa (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018b) and this period of rapid economic growth is often referred to as the Ivorian miracle.

In spite of its economic success, it became obvious that the protracted period under French influence had consequences on the way the new President Houphouët-Boigny ruled the country throughout his more than 30 years as president. Beyond authoritatively leading the country and its economy, the new leader and senior public officials further inherited extravagant lifestyles and the country's leaders exploited their positions to maximize their personal gain. Thus, corruption quickly became widely pervasive throughout Côte d'Ivoire and its first government as an independent country (Gnomblrou, 2015).

Yet, as the political stability in Côte d'Ivoire persisted and as the commodity exports resumed to be successful, the Ivorian people experienced social development and prosperity. However, as commodity prices fell, including the prices of cocoa, during the 1980's the economy started to fail and then a discourse regarding the systemic corruption arose with the consequences that the government were rightfully being accused of large-scale corruption (Mathur, 1990).

After the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, a turbulent time of political instability, polarisation, and impaired governance followed. The political clash between president aspirants continuously escalated and culminated in 2002 when a coup attempt ignited a civil war which further impaired the governance in the country and the prevalent corruption issues became severely worse. Despite the serious situation prevailing domestically, Côte d'Ivoire joined several anti-corruption conventions in the early 2000's including signing the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2003 (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2003).

Gnomblerou (2015) puts the recent changes in CPI in Côte d'Ivoire in an historical context. In the 1990's, the country performed significantly better in terms of their CPI with a score of 63. However, the turbulent decade containing political instability and the civil war transformed Côte d'Ivoire to become one of the most corrupt countries in the world and despite the recent initiatives by the government, corruption remains a systemic problem in the country. Gnomblerou (2015) further argues that corruption has been so pervasive and persistent in Côte d'Ivoire for a such long time that corrupt officials are not always aware of the fact that corruption constitutes as serious crime. As in many other fragile states in which corruption have been widespread for a protracted period, petty forms of corruptions such as receiving bribes is an accepted and necessary element to deal with ineffective administration.

IV. Theory and Method

Building upon the historical transition from a patrimonial, nepotistic and corrupt bureaucracy to a Weberian, professionalized and clean one in the case of Sweden, Jan Teorell and Bo Rothstein developed a theoretical framework in which they take a solution-oriented approach to solve the issue of systemic corruption. In doing so, the authors try to explain how a country can break with systemic corruption. This is done in their two companion articles published in the *Scandinavian Political Studies* (Teorell and Rothstein, 2015; Rothstein and Teorell, 2015). This section provides an overview of their argument and the theory to use it as an analytical framework of this study.

In the first piece (Teorell and Rothstein, 2015), the authors analyze the exogenous triggers of change in Sweden for the eradication of corruption and the formation of a

Weberian state. Drawing on court hearings of cases of malfeasance among public officials in the period 1720–1850, in case of Sweden, the authors contend that the exogenous event was the loss of a war against Russia in the early 19th century. The fact that Sweden actually lost the war is argued to be important as it generated a sense among the Swedish elites and policymakers that the existence of Sweden had been under threat. The sense of weak sovereignty unfolded into a wave of reforms and changes in the Swedish political system and the constitution. Nevertheless, this exogenous factor is not considered to be enough, and while assuming that no fragile states would be keen on taking the advice of losing a war as a precondition for breaking systemic corruption, some other lessons are drawn from the Swedish case.

Having said this, in the second part (Rothstein and Teorell, 2015) of their companion articles, the authors rather develop an endogenous theory of anti-corruption reforms and recognizes that endogenous and exogenous factors are closely related as a long-lasting change will most likely come about if the agents of society realize that if action is omitted, the agents as a group are under threat. The authors highlight three crucial factors that helped Sweden to overcome the issue of systemic corruption. The three additional factors are as follows: (1) changes in courts and the legal system; (2) recognition of the problem by the main contemporary political actors; and (3) the new liberal ideology.

First, it is argued that the establishment of an uncorrupted court system is imperative as it would otherwise be senseless to punish corrupt officials in a certain country. That is to say that changes in the court system enables judges to press charges against corrupted individuals. Second, the recognition of the problem of corruption among the leading politicians in a country is of utmost importance. That recognition also entails that political actors are acknowledging the importance of politicians being seen as legitimate by the citizens. Third, it is noteworthy that Sweden was showcased by a strong liberal political opposition against the monarchical rule and conservative aristocracy. The authors indicate that the change is not necessarily a good thing if it does not lead towards improvements and leads away from systemic corruption. The ideas of impartiality and professionalism in the civil service, and the distancing away from patrimonialism and nepotism is primarily embedded in liberal ideology.

As mentioned by the two Scandinavian political scientists, the Swedish experience of breaking with systemic corruption have broad-ranging implications regarding how

corruption in the modern world are to be combatted. Therefore, for assessing if a country is on their way to break with systemic corruption, the theoretical frameworks presents an empirical blueprint on how a country can act to break with systemic corruption by enacting proven measures. More importantly, as earlier mentioned, there is a limited supply of literature providing such coherent guidelines on how systemic corruption is to be fought internally in affected countries and the topic itself is with regards to its importance relatively under-studied.

To answer the question if Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are on their way to break with systemic corruption, and what further initiatives are needed to ensure their success, this study will apply the analytical framework provided by Rothstein and Teorell (2015). How the three indigenous factors are being addressed by the recent anti-corruption initiatives by the current leaders of the two countries? This is mostly due to two reasons; firstly, the framework is based on a proven method that lays out concrete and applicable measures that a country can apply to eradicate systemic corruption. Secondly, there is a lack of other frameworks focusing on how a country can break with systemic corruption.

In doing so, the following section investigates if the improvements in terms of CPI can be explained by the theoretical framework, and identifies which of the three factors the two countries are in need of further efforts to ensure utilization of the gained momentum and to break with systemic corruption. To bring additional substance to the analysis, this study will also compare the initiatives between the two countries on each of the three factors to try to infer if the countries have chosen to focus on different branches of the framework.

Furthermore, this study will delimit the analysis and solely focus on anti-corruption initiatives that has been launched by the two countries' current leaders that entered into office shortly before each country started to showcase significant improvements in terms of their CPI. This implies that this study will evaluate the changes made from 2012, when President Macky Sall entered into office, and onwards in Senegal and from 2010, when President Alassane Ouattara assumed office, and onwards in Côte d'Ivoire.

V. Analysis and Discussion

1. Changes in Courts and the Legal System

As highlighted before, according to Rothstein and Teorell (2015), an uncorrupted court system is crucial in a country as it would otherwise be troublesome to prosecute corrupt officials. Changes in the court system enabling this could be considered a cornerstone in the strive to break with systemic corruption.

The incumbent President Macky Sall of Senegal has recognized ensuring good governance as a key strategic objective and this has entailed initiatives directed to enhance anti-corruption institutions. In his first year in office, Sall established The National Office against Fraud and Corruption (OFNAC). Similar to The High Authority for Good Governance (HAGB) in Côte d'Ivoire, OFNAC is supposed to further investigate potential corruption cases, react on people's corruption concerns and allegations, and pass them on to the judiciary for prosecution (Shipley, 2018a).

President Sall has also revoked a specialist ad-hoc court to handle corruption cases, called the Cour de Répression de l'Enrichissement illicite (CREI; meaning the Court of Suppression of Illicit Enrichment). And yet, despite the supposed independence of CREI and the appealing idea underlying the establishment of such, Sall has received a lot of criticism for how CREI is currently being used. The judiciary have received critique for poor follow-up on the cases identified by OFNAC. In 2014, as a part of Sall's effort to punish the people behind the former government's widespread corruption practices, the former President Abdoulaye Wade's son was imprisoned for corruption after having embezzled large amount of public funds.

However, the trial preceding the verdict has received a lot of criticism as the trial was solely used as a symbol for the fight against corruption and because the court used reversed burden of proof. Since then, the President's influence on CREI has been further questioned. Before the 2019 election, the re-elected President Sall was accused of manipulating the judicial system in an attempt to prevent political opponents by ambiguously enforcing corruption laws (Economist, 2018). Due to this, claims have been made that the people of Senegal no longer trust the court system and calls for a reform is starting to rise. (Barry, 2019).

In Côte d'Ivoire, a corrupt judicial system has prevailed for a long time and

corruption allegations towards senior officials in the country are seldom properly investigated by an un-biased and independent authority. However, under the incumbent President Alassane Ouattara, some notable initiatives have been launched to eradicate corruption in the judicial system and to ensure that corrupt individuals become prosecuted. In particular, Ouattara formed the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) in 2013 as a part of his anti-corruption plan. The HABG is an independent authority that among other things is supposed to investigate corruption practices, handing corruption-cases to the public prosecutor, as well as taking care of people's corruption-related complaints and accusations.

However, even though established to act independently, it is currently acting under the president's office and the independence of the institution can be questioned. In the aftermath of the civil war, the judicial system has received critique for the tendency of war-crimes investigations mainly being conducted towards the defeated former President Laurent Gbagbo-supporters, out of which many have been prosecuted and convicted while very few cases have been initiated towards Ouattara-supporters (Shipley, 2018b). It can be questioned whether the initiated changes are primarily to suit the political agenda of Ouattara, rather than fighting corruption and ensuring an uncorrupted court system.

According to Bertelsmann Stiftung's country report on Côte d'Ivoire (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018b), the judiciary are still prone to executive interventions and have not been given sufficient resources to truly tackle the problems of corruption within the court system. Even though the Ouattara regime has been proven to be effective in implementing structural reforms of the country's main sector, the planned structural reforms of the judicial system have not been as effective. For instance, Ouattara's plan of establishing a "Special Tribunal" to handle corruption cases has not yet been implemented. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018b).

Despite having designated special corruption-judges focused on corruption cases, these judges often have their hands tied to other cases as well meaning that the processing of corruption cases are too slow, and allegations are often-time allowed to ebb away (IACC, 2019). Nonetheless, compared to the previous leaders in Côte d'Ivoire, President Ouattara have actually initiated some changes to cope with the corruption-affected court system and only time can tell whether the enacted changes are constituting a will to address the corruption issues.

As shown above, there is a lot of similarities between the enacted changes in

Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. Both countries have established an independent coordinating institution (HABG and OFNAC) to handle corruption-related issues and facilitate for the people to make their voices heard on such issues. Besides, both countries are keen on the idea of having a special court handling corruption-related issues. The initiatives are based on promises to fight the systemic corruption but it seems like the leaders of each country are exploiting the system to target dissidents challenging the leaders. Thus, both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are in need of further initiatives to ensure effectiveness of pressing charges against corrupt individuals, not just those of the political opposition.

2. Recognition of the Problem by the Main Contemporary Political Actors

Rothstein and Teorell (2015) argues that the recognition of the corruption problem among the leading political actors and the political elites in a country is crucial, for otherwise there would be no motive for change. The recognition of the corruption problems further entails that political actors are realizing the importance of politicians being seen as legitimate by the people.

In both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, from their entrance into office, the current leaders have publicly shown great commitment to battle corruption, and as illustrated in the previous section, they have launched several initiatives aimed at tackling corruption-related issues. Beyond the initiatives described in the previous section, in Côte d'Ivoire, President Ouattara have spread his commitment to curb corruption through various public statements and advertising campaigns. For example, early during his presidency, one of his committees rolled out an anti-corruption campaign conveying messages such as “it destroyed my region” or “it killed my son”, hence vigorously sending a message against corruption and powerfully illustrating the negative effects of it (The Economist, 2013).

As the first president, Ouattara ensured that his ministers ratified an “anti-corruption oath” to ensure that the problem is recognized in his government and that such practices would not occur. This could be interpreted an indication of the fact that the main political actors in Côte d'Ivoire are recognizing the problem around corruption and are at least on paper prepared to ensure that they are willing to take a stand. However, the effectiveness of such oath is debatable and some Ivorians argue that the systemic corruption is as present now as during the former government with the

difference of it being better concealed.

Throughout his presidency, Ouattara has publicly made statements to key stakeholders, including the African Union (AU) and his people, that he is doing what is necessary to curb corruption and improve governance (Shipley, 2018b) and this has among other things resulted in that the headquarter of the African Development Bank (AfDB) has been moved back to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire after having been established in Tunis, Tunisia due to the Ivorian civil war in the country (Kie, 2013). This could further be interpreted as a sign that other stakeholders are believing in, and reinforces the belief, that Ouattara are making credible long-term commitments to curb systemic corruption.

In similar ways as in Côte d'Ivoire, the current Senegalese President Sall has from early on publicly signaled his commitment to fight corruption. Sall and his government has among other things enacted the "Plan for an Emerging Senegal (PES)." PES lays out the strategic path for the country over the long- and mid-term future and is built around three key-priorities. Out of these three, one of the key priorities is to ensure good governance and the fight against corruption and non-transparency are further outlined as strategically crucial objectives (Shipley, 2018a). This shows that the main political actors are recognizing the corruption issues in the country and are publicly open to fight it.

Sall has himself also made many public statements regarding his commitment to fight corruption. In 2014, Sall enacted a law under which senior officials also have to disclose their assets along with the president. These records are not publicly available information except the president's (Freedom House, 2018). This further reinforces the impression that main political actors are recognizing the corruption issues in the country and are willing to act on it. However, despite the recognition of the corruption issue and the other various desirable improvements in Senegal, a recent survey conducted by OFNAC shows that over 95% of the Senegalese population have experience of corruption in their immediate surroundings, and hence much is left to be done (Sy Camara, 2019)

The public commitment of fighting corruption represents a major break from the previous administrations in both countries. However, as mentioned before, much of the symbolic anti-corruption actions taken by the leaders in both countries have to a large extent been aimed at political opponents and previous regimes and expressing their commitment can merely be a disguised tactic to stress their devotion to the issue. As

only time can determine the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures enacted due to the recognition of the corruption issues, current main political actors at least seems to recognize the problem and as Rothstein and Teorell (2015) argues, that must to some extent be the starting point for change to happen. It is evident that both administrations are despite their public commitment to fight systemic corruption struggling to be seen as legitimate and capable by the majority of their populations, as highlighted by the mentioned national survey.

3. The New Liberal Ideology

In Senegal, President Sall calls himself a social liberal and during his presidency, Sall have enacted several market friendly reforms to turn Senegal into an economic powerhouse in the region. By investing heavily into restoring the Senegalese infrastructure, Sall is hoping to form a regional business hub and reduce the hurdles of doing business in the country. As part of PSE, Sall and his government have enacted several liberal reforms and has been acknowledged by the World Bank to be among the best “business reforming” countries and among the “best business environment improvers” in the world (Deloitte, 2017).

The government also tried to encourage the private sector through various initiatives and programs, but it has failed to generate the desired impact. This is mainly due to several macroeconomic- and structural reasons. In general, the business climate for private enterprises are still, despite recent improvements, quite troublesome. However, one of the factors that have previously been considered one of the largest hurdles of doing business and thus discouraging private investments have been the insufficient infrastructure. Thus, the initiatives of restoring and investing heavily in the national infrastructure is a strategically important step. Yet, initial reports from various infrastructure projects have been gloomy and reports of delays due to bad planning etc. has surfaced (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018a). However, the reforms with the intention to enhance the business climate in Senegal is a step in the right direction towards a more liberal ideology.

In Côte d’Ivoire, President Ouattara has been acknowledged as a reliable advocate of liberalism and in 2015 he was awarded by Liberal International for his “commitment to support the development of liberalism” around the world in general, and in Côte d’Ivoire in particular (Liberal International, 2015). During his time as president he has

publicly stated his belief in liberalism and has been focusing on conducting macro-economic reforms and reforms aimed to enhance the business climate in the country. These reforms seem to have yielded desirable outcomes and Ivorian authorities are claiming that a new Ivorian miracle is underway as represented by a rapid GDP growth rate since Ouattara entered into office.

Under the Ouattara administration, Côte d'Ivoire has joined several partnerships to increase transparency, and hence accountability, that involves the civil society. For instance, in 2015, the country joined the Open Government Partnership which aims to improve government transparency with the help from civil society by e.g. giving them better access to information and data on government actions. Other initiatives that involves the civil society has led to open contracting in some of Côte d'Ivoire's main industries, meaning that contracts are being disclosed to a larger extent than before (Shipley, 2018b). Also, worth noticing is the fact that President Ouattara previously worked as an official for International Monetary Fund (IMF) and might hence be affected by the neoliberalist views of the fund (Donnan, 2016). Compared to the previous President Gbagbo, Ouattara stands for a more liberal and pro-business ideology and constitutes a welcomed development.

However, there is still much to do and the Ouattara's regime has been heavily accused for nepotism (Africa Intelligence, 2014) and the changes made by Ouattara have increased the state intervention in some of the nation's main sectors. During then-Managing Director of IMF Christine Lagarde's visit to Côte d'Ivoire in 2013, she stated that one of the most crucial objectives for Côte d'Ivoire to maintain its economic momentum and improve even further is to root out corruption from politics and public administration (Lagarde, 2013).

As illustrated above, both the current leaders in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are assuming a more liberal agenda compared to what was the previous administrations by primarily focusing on enhancing the business climate in their countries. Furthermore, it seems like the enacted liberal agenda in both countries is emphasizing some of the concepts as put forward by Rothstein and Teorell (2015) as appealing with such ideology as described above. However, it seems like Senegal through PES has a clearer printed liberal agenda and are through the plan publicly conveying the benefits and why such agenda attracts and thus why it is the cornerstone of the future strategic plan for the country.

Although both countries are, what it seems to be steering towards a more liberal

ideology, many shortcomings remain regarding e.g. ensuring meritocracy in key sectors as nepotism are still prevalent in both countries. In the light of the Rothstein and Teorell's (2015) framework, the changes made seems to lead in the preferred direction and given a rising liberal agenda in the country, and among citizens, political oppositions and in business, could further help the country to break with systemic corruption in the long term.

VI. Conclusions

Given the analysis above, it is fair to say that both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are putting considerable effort into addressing the factors as brought forwards by Rothstein and Teorell (2015). It might be argued that the two countries are on the right path in the longer term to liberate themselves from the chuckles of corruption and all the suffering that comes with. Indeed, Senegal is showing a greater long-term commitment and stronger decisiveness in enacting measures to fight against corruption, primarily within the judiciary. This conclusion is primarily originating from the observation that many of the promised reforms by President Ouattara in Côte d'Ivoire have remained just a promise, as e.g. the special tribunal for handling corruption cases, while in Senegal, President Sall has shown significant drive in implementing his measures such as establishing CREI and OFNAC.

Yet, it is noticeable how seemingly similar paths Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire Senegal have chosen to fight systemic corruption. On each of the three factors examined in the analysis, both countries are enacting notably similar measures. Hence, it is not obvious if either of the countries is significantly differing in terms of what factor of the framework they are focusing on. However, it seems that both leaders have effectively and to a large extent focused on convincing their citizens of their recognition of the corruption problem and thus conveying that they are the right leader to fight it. Of course, this might be due to the fact that signaling commitment is much easier than delivering concrete results over the short term. For further research, it could be necessary to sort out the practical reasons underlying why the countries have enacted similar measures.

The improvements in terms of CPI as showcased by Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire can

be explained by improvements on each branch of the framework as provided by Rothstein and Teorell. It is also interesting to notice that Transparency International themselves are attributing the improvements made in CPI as showcased by both countries to good outcomes of “legal, policy and administration” reforms as well as the devotion illustrated by both countries’ leaders towards fighting corruption. That is, Transparency International is attributing the improvements made to similar aspects as those advocated by Rothstein and Teorell (2015) in their framework, and hence confirming the views of the authors that the framework has wide ranging implications for how a country in the modern world can fight systemic corruption.

As the Nigerian anti-corruption official Nuhu Ribadu once noted: “When you fight corruption, it fights back” and recent events have cast doubts over the anti-corruption measures in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. In both countries there are signs that many of the measures taken regarding fighting corruption has mostly been used and aimed towards political opponents and recent incidents before the Senegalese presidential election, where President Sall locked up political dissidents on ambiguous corruption laws are of-course worrying. Moreover, the lack of significant corruption scandals within the Sall administration are according to many just further evidences that impunity still exist. Similarly, In Côte d'Ivoire, people have been starting to question the credibility and devotion of President Ouattara’s anti-corruption campaign.

Therefore, to ensure that the rarely given momentum that has been earned by Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are being fully exploited, further actions are needed. Policies primarily aimed towards increasing meritocracy in society and ensuring impartiality in the judiciary should be the main objectives of both countries going forward. As the prevalent nepotism and ambiguous trials against dissidents in each country are severely hurting the legitimacy of the governments, it can easily lead to a situation in which the leaders are losing the confidence from the people which could potentially undermine the recent anti-corruption improvements.

Additionally, it might further entail that corruption is becoming even more widely recognized as something natural and inevitable, and hence reducing the incentives and pressure for policymakers to act on the issue. To ensure that people in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire remains involved in anti-corruption issues, both countries, and in the extension the international community, should enact policies ensuring the safety of anti-corruption investigative journalist as that would further facilitate the fight against the systemic corruption prevailing. For instance, in Côte d'Ivoire, by allowing criticism

towards President Ouattara and his failure of install the “special tribunal” for corruption cases, it is more likely that such change will come. To accomplish these objectives, it is important that the international community is condemning all measures taken to suppress the free media and compromises the impartiality of the court systems.

It is worth recognizing that there are differences between the 18th century Swedish culture and the prevailing cultures in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. It could be hypothesized that cultural dissimilarities are having an influence how a country should act to most effectively break with systemic corruption. If so, it could be the case that the framework provided by Rothstein & Teorell (2015) should be customised to better suit other cultures. Therefore, blindly applying the framework on the two African countries could be a potential limitation of this study. However, to confirm that, the cultural impact on anti-corruption efforts and its efficiency have to be established.

To conclude, even though corruption is still prevalent and there are worrying signs on the horizon with regards to the anti-corruption efforts made in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, the steps taken by political leaders in the two countries constitutes momentous improvements. Given what is advocated by Rothstein and Teorell (2015) for a country to break with systemic corruption, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are on the right path and that both countries are likely to continue to improve and thus liberate themselves from the shackles of corruption and all the suffering that comes with it.

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<Abstract>

Analysis on Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire towards Breaking with Systemic Corruption: Focusing on the Theory of Rothstein and Teorell

Tae In Park · Carl Jakob Kalbe

The World Bank estimates that the annual cost of global corruption equals roughly 5% of global GDP, and the problem is most severe in fragile states. Despite the importance and urgency of fighting corruption, few of the fragile states are improving in terms of their Corruption Perception Indices (CPI). However, two countries are striving in the opposite direction; Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. Under their current leaders, the countries have launched several anti-corruption measures that seems to have borne fruit over the short term. By analysing how the initiatives taken by the current presidents since their entry into office are addressing the factors as brought forward by Rothstein and Teorell (2015) as crucial if a country is to break with systemic corruption, the analysis shows that both countries have taken momentous steps compared to under previous administration to break with systemic corruption. It is illustrated that both countries are launching similar initiatives, yet with seemingly varying devotion. However, despite recent improvements, much is left to be done in both countries if they are to permanently break with systemic corruption, particularly to ensure an impartial and independent judiciary.

Key words: Anti-corruption initiatives, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Systemic corruption, Rothstein and Teorell