

Military Corruption Defined and Perceived by Soldiers

군 부패와 군인들의 부패인지에 관한 연구

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ABSTRACT

이 연구의 목적은 미8군에 근무하는 군인들의 부패인지 수준에 관한 부패연구를 통하여 행정학에 있어서의 새로운 패러다임을 창출하는데 있다. 즉 이 연구는 부패인지가 사회조사를 통하여 실제로 군에 존재하는지 여부를 연구하는데 목적이 있다. 또 다른 연구목적은 부패인지지수를 창출하고 유효화하는데 있다. 이 연구에서 중요한 발견은 다음과 같다.

첫째, 79%의 군인들은 사기, 예산낭비와 직권남용이 가장 심각한 문제임을 인지하고 있었다. 그러므로 부패와 부패인지는 미8군에 존재하고 있다는 사실을 알게 되었다. 둘째, 모든 부패지수의 다섯 가지 변수는 상호 높은 상관 관계가 있고 내적으로 일치되고 있었다. 셋째, 부패인지지수의 아홉 가지 변수들은 높은 직접적인 정의 방향의 상관관계를 보여 주었고 내적으로 .838이라는 Cronbach's Alpha 검정으로 증명되었다. 이 연구는 부패와 부패인지 연구에 있어서 새로운 패러다임의 창출을 위한 경험적인 근거를 제공하고 있다

Key Words : Military Corruption(군부패), Corruption Perception Level(부패인지),
Corruption Prevention Techniques(부패방지기술)

1. Introduction

A country's military can be both its might and savior or lead to its decline and downfall. "Defense plays many important roles, one of them being insurance against political instability."¹⁾

Now and always governments rely on their military for a basis of continued sovereignty and authority. This relationship however can become weakened when a

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1) Blomberg 1996 introduces his model, " I develop and test a model to examine the economic effects of political instability and military expenditure. Defense plays three important roles in the model: (i) it provides insurance against political instability; (ii) it augments the human capital stock by training the labor force; but (iii) it comes at the expense of consumption. The resulting theory predicts that increased political instability or increased defense can inhibit economic growth."

military becomes corrupt and is influenced by organized crime (Chledowski, 2005, p. 1). In times of vast corruption in government, the military is looked to not only as a place that enforces high standards to live by, but an organization that trains everyday civilian recruits from all walks of life into Soldiers that enforce, live, and die by values.

Even with top notch recruits we would not be successful if we didn't provide leadership, professional development, and technical training throughout their careers; we constantly build and reinforce core values that everyone wearing a uniform must live by: duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty. Our core values are leadership, professionalism, and technical know-how (DOD 101, para 8, 2006).

Yet the military can also be a place in some other countries where, given the right opportunities, there is a chance where politicians or military leadership can abuse their power or allow others to use them to become their personal oppressors, political enforcers, and human rights abusers. The military by its very nature a potential threat to democracy, but in well-established civilian democracies supremacy has generally been maintained... (Sundhaussen, 1998, p.329). Therefore, the Military must be watched and kept corruption free as possible.

1) Statement of the Problem

Currently, the United States Army's is fighting a War on Terrorism, anything that detracts from the mission needs to found out and eliminated. With the huge cost of war increasing every day, one must ensure that corruption is not present or a possible cause of the increased costs. It is imperative for the government to minimize costs to help in reducing the cost of this war in both people and money on American families and taxpayers.

2) Purpose of the Study

The goal of this study is to research and collect empirical data to establish if corruption is present and at what perceived levels. No prior studies investigated this topic. Defining this darkness called corruption will be challenging. I believe there is a perception of corruption or physical corruption being conducted. If Soldiers who are responsible for guarding a country's border day and night have a lack of belief that they are defending something worth saving or staying with, then this affects everything from their ability to help defend their perspective government's polices, to defeating their nation's enemies.

This research is intended to define what is military corruption and corruption perception. It will attempt to explain what the key areas of possible corruption and corruption perceptions are, and evaluate if any are present in the military. Next, I will evaluate if there is a corruption perception problem within the Army and assess how many and what level of Soldiers see it. I will construct new variables based and two indexes from the scales of corruption and corruption perception to be tested using descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis to test for validity, reliability, and consistency to construct. The two indexes to be used in future research if proven valid.

3) Significance of the Study

Extant literature in the fields of political science, public administration, and social psychology demonstrate that corruption, specifically the perception of corruption of the leadership, seriously erodes commitment to the organization. Therefore, empirical information on military corruption and corruption perception differences in the military ranks is becoming increasingly relevant. There is a need to collect empirical data on this subject to study if corruption is present. Currently, the study of military corruption and corruption perception is an area that has not been researched or addressed academically. Therefore, it is hope by conducting this study that I will fill a current need in the literature base.

According to Kim (1993), corruption studies have been ataboo subject until recently, and not just the military has been ignored by the academic world. Jefferies (1977) first put the study of the military as part of public administration forth. Extant research has been done to study this path or to validate its connections with public administration and little to nothing has been done on corruption studies in the military. Military corruption and corruption perception studies has been a long neglected aspect of public administration. This article will introduce and address the sensitive issues of corruption and corruption perception of Soldiers in the United States Army and supply an initial valid database from which continuing studies will occur.

There is a plethora of dissertations and academic articles on bureaucratic (public administration) studies on corruption and ethics (Jin, 2004; see also Dobel, 1978; Kang, 1997; Kim, 1985; Ogus, 2004; Sheleifer & Vishny, 1993). Access to bureaucrats willing to participate in corruption studies has always been a challenge; it is even worse trying to pierce the veil of the military due to its closed environment, unique culture, and secretive nature.

One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual servicemembers that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness for the individual unit members (U.S. Army AR 600-20, 2006, p. 90). Trust is central to both institutional and interpersonal relationships (McAllister, 1995). In order to build and establish effective teams, trust is the building block of esprit de corps. Trust is a key element if Soldiers are to fight and win on any battlefield. Corruption is a known element that breaks down trust and breeds resentment and dissatisfaction. Soldiers need to be able to stay focused on the mission and not worry about possible corruption. The main factor to be focused on is the Eighth United States Army currently stationed in the Republic of Korea. The major research question that is posed in this study, "Are Soldiers perceiving corruption within the Eighth United States Army?"

Focused on this, what are the implications of corruption perception if it is present within the military? Is there a current need for development of new anti-corruption strategies or just modification of existing practices and rigid enforcement? Further, should corruption studies include the military as part of public administration research?

2. Literature Review

Internationalization of deployments on the War on Terrorism is becoming a major feature of life in the military and its mission. In order to meet the continued needs of mission support in the War on Terrorism for the Commander In Chief the President of the United States of America, the United States Army needs to sustain a committed Soldier base. The difficulties to maintain mission readiness posture are evident and arising quickly as Soldiers are failing to reenlist after coming back from the War. The Army has implemented policies of "Stop Loss," added new regulations stopping Soldiers from retiring if they are in a deploying unit or must wait to retire 90 days after re-deploying from a war-zone. Constant changes in deployment length, mission changes, restrictions on the rules of engagement and lack of information can cause distrust. It stands to reason that this Soldier base can be eroded by the lack of faith in the institution that provides command and control over them.

The Department of Defense of the United States of America government is an organization of some 5.5 million active duty and retired military and civilian

personnel and over 9.3 million contractors, with 700 billion dollars in assets and 455 billion dollars in yearly disbursements. The Department of Defense is made up of the following components: United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, and the United States Marines. Currently the United States Army is made up of 502,400 active duty Army troops, backed up by 700,000 National Guard and Army Reservists military members (Yamanaka, 2005). In an agency of this size, the agency must ever be watchful and always looking out for fraud, waste, abuse, lack of trust, and favoritism: the foundations of corruption.

1) The United State Army

The history of the United States Army started with the rebelling colonial militia's of the British Empire in 14 June 1775 in the thirteen colonies of the New World. The Continental Congress authorized the creation of the National Force that General George Washington called the Army 1 January 1776. Yet even the newly created Army who defeated the British Empire almost rebelled against its fledgling government shortly after the ending of American Revolution. It was the actions of the General Washington quelling a group of rebellious officers by displaying what selfless leadership and subordination to civilian authority meant (U.S. Army, FM-1, 2005). From humble beginnings, the U.S. Army has grown to become an institution that have upheld and defended the U.S. Constitution for more than 230 years.

The soldier must be rooted in the past to understand the present so that he may project himself into the future (DA PAM 200 - 20 1956). As it has been told to me a thousand times is that history will continue to repeat itself if we fail to study it, remember it, and learn from it. The United States Army is a diverse organization that in its history has fought many wars, expanded in times of need, downsized in times of peace and continuously modernized not only its weapons systems but also its waysof training, thinking and treating Soldiers. This organization in its history has done it all and continues to adapt in an ever-changing world.

The Army is a hierarchical decision base structure in which there is a much-defined chain of command that wearsits rank visually to show subordinates who is in charge. Until the new people adapt to the organization resistance to change and confusion of what is expected and how it is to be done hinders it. Soldiers usually face this transition period through what is called basic training where Civilians are indoctrinated into the Army. If the United States of America is considered the melting pot of the world then the U.S. Army is the stew created by this pot.

2) Known instances of Corruption

The study of military corruption is relatively new and little research has been done in this specific area. The military is a closed society in many ways. All military bases have been closed to public access since 9/11. The keeping of such tight security today is reminiscent of the security emplaced at the installation called AREA 51 a top-secret research and development place for the military. Just as AREA 51 brought about controversy because the public did not know what is going on in that particular installation so is the other bases of the military with the tightened security. The need for security and safety of Soldiers and dependents is necessary but it is still bringing about perception changes within the military community and the public eyes. The more secrets you keep from people, the bigger their distrust of an institution will be.

West Point Military Academy has been the home of many famous U.S. Army Generals and later on, even a couple of Presidents, Ulysses S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Yet, even in the United States of America's famous West Point Military Academy where duty, honor, and country is the mantra, has had people take the walk of shame because of fraud. Studies have shown that people of all ages cheat at something and that is usually on a test. This Bastogne of Honor has had dark days as seen in the graduating classes of 1951 through 1954. The scandal involved 200 students cheating on their final exams for the semester. Of those 200 students, the Honor Committee found 83 students guilty and those students had to resign their positions in the Academy and take the walk of shame. If the Academy had not caught those cheaters those young men would have been commissioned as officers in the United States of Army the following week and leading young men soon after.

The problem at that institution during that dark time was several leaders felt that the playing of a game called football was essential to creating future leaders. This attitude eventually created a culture of cheating to allow substandard academic individuals that excelled in the playing of football to stay when they should have been dismissed from the academy. The value of winning at any cost on the football field pushed by senior military leaders of the coaching staff caused a total breakdown in the Honor Code of the Academy in the football department. If at the premier institution of training future leaders has faculty that will take short cuts to make the ends justify in their minds, we have a serious problem in the foundation of our military schooling system. Another well-known cheating scandal rocked West

Pointagain in 1976, when 200 students were caught cheating on a take home exam causing 152 to be dismissed or resigned from the Academy. The military academies originally created when the U.S. military did not have the educational resources, capacity or time to train officers effectively. That is no longer the case. Do we still need these academies today? These are the known cases of corruption that were to big to cover up, have there been more in this institution off by itself?

The modern military is highly educated, certified, and equipped to train officers, as seen by Officer Candidate School (OCS), Officer Basic Course and Officer Advance Course, which produces officers every year. With increasing the size of the OCS system and changing how officers can commission²⁾ then we might be able to eliminate those distractions that are not essential to the creating of officers.

Another example of known military corruption involved a case of bribery by one COL Moran, who decided to fall away from the standard of doing right. Who, while Commander of the U.S. Army Contracting Command Korea (CCK), orchestrated a massive scheme of kickbacks and bribes involving an agree 750,000 dollars in exchange for his influence in the awarding millions of dollars in construction and IT contracts to Korean contractors. At the time of his arrest and search of his quarters only 400,000 dollars was found stuff in his mattress (Department of Justice, Yang, & Mrozek, 2003). Col Moran is not the first officer and only officer to be relieved from his duties as a Contracting Officer. In Iraq in 2003, a LTC Harrison was charged with accepting bribes for conspiring to fix the awarding of contracts. Again, in Iraq a LTC Wheeler was charged with bribery and money laundering, both cases are still pending. Meanwhile their coconspirator a Mr. Robert Stein pleaded guilty in Federal Court on 2 February 2006 to the same charges (DOJ, 2006). The requesting and accepting of bribes is corruption and labeled as such.

2) I argue that all Officers should have to serve at least four years as an enlisted member. This would allow Soldiers to adapt to the military culture and become proficient at being a basic Soldier first. Soldiers wanting to be Officers need to display leadership potential, initiative, want, and drive to be an Officer. Other requirements: letters of recommendation should come from the Soldiers immediate supervisor, platoon sergeant, 1st Sergeant, and three different levels of Commanders from the chain of command, physically fit with no medical limitations; each Soldier should pass a situational comprehensive board and warrior skill testing. In addition, before appearing before the board they must have earned at least a 2-year degree on their off time. This would show commitment to the Army and the want to excel. The Army would benefit from having a Soldier doing a daily job for the organization. In addition, only the truly motivated would proceed to become an Officer that has served in the trenches, learning to be a follower first. In this way, the Army would not be wasting four years of a potential Officer's efforts in an institution, where they might not even succeed and be commissioned.

High profile cases of abuse that have rocked the U.S. Army and the other services range from physical abuse, murder, position and power abuse, sexual misconduct to sexual assault and rape. These acts have been committed by all ranks from the lowly Private all the way up to a Four Star General. Names and places that bring back dreaded memories not just to the public but also to those that wore the uniform with honor. The My Lai Massacre 1968, Tailhook 1991, Aberdeen 1996, General Hale, General Byrnes, General Maher, Rear-Admiral Hooper, CPT Medina, CPT Robinson, LT Calley, CSMA McKinney, CSM Miller, SSG Simpson. Why do these things sicken us in a society that grows ever more depraved and violent? It is because they were all people you are supposed to trust that committed these acts. All of these were senior leaders, who were trained to Army Standards, and knew better, but still they fell into the clutches of corruption. Many more cases happen that never make the papers, which is because of Uniform Code of Military Justice can deal with a lot of it by chapter proceedings and keeping it quiet for the good order and discipline of the Army. Only five General Officers have ever been punished for types of corruption under UCMJ since it was rewritten in 1951. So, corruption has at times reared its ugly head even in the very organizations that are supposed to be protecting us from our enemies not preying on us and each other.

3) Approaches and Models of Corruption

Bureaucratic corruption phenomena have been studied using many different concepts using existing approaches. Kim (1993) provide a brief summary of some of them:

Moral Approaches (Benson, Liu) All illegal or unethical use of bureaucratic power. Institutional Approach (Myrdal, Huntington) Byproducts of fragile governing institutions of underdeveloped countries. Market/Exchange Approach (Leff, Jacob, Tilman) Maximizing unit and pecuniary gains. Public Interest Approach (Friedrich, Lasswell) Betrayal of public interests. Functional Approach (Nye) Byproducts of modernization or development. Post-Functional Approach (Werner) Universal concept of corruption: spill-over effect of corruption (e.g. Leader-Follower). Integrated Approach (Kim) Bureaucrats' deviant behavior resulted from violation of socio-cultural norms (p. 6).

Research conducted using the above approaches focused solely on the action of bureaucrats, the military, which is a major part of any government, was not researched, and addressed using any of these approaches. The military service

members in all modern democracies are a subservient entity to the executive branch of government that is elected by the people. This is shown in the democracy of the United States of America where the President of the United States of America is the Commander In Chief of all branches of the military. The approaches listed in table 1 looked at the actions of public officials, and on the fulfilling of his or her personal self-interests, and total lack of ethical control while serving in public office.

Though many in the field of study conceptually think it is still cloudy on what and how we should measure corruption according to Tanzi (1998, p 577):

Simply measuring bribes paid would ignore many corrupt acts that are not accompanied by the payment of bribes. An attempt to measure acts of corruption rather than the amounts of bribes paid would require counting many relatively unimportant actions and identifying each act—information that is simply not available. While there are no direct ways of measuring corruption, there are several indirect ways of getting information about its prevalence in a country or in an institution.

One must remember Alemann (2004) basic insight as it tends to be forgotten:

The fact that corruption is kept secret makes it difficult to interpret statistical evidence about the act and its perpetrators because measurement depends very much on the intensity with which the offence is prosecuted (p. 31).

One must look at corruption with the knowledge that only the most tormented soul will answer a survey saying they are corrupt. That type of action would be an action of extreme guilt, which few practicing corruption have.

Because of the difficulties in prosecution, plea bargains, immunity for some, and confidential testimony, many researchers find the task of recording and maintaining accurate records of successfully prosecuted corruption insurmountable to achieve. Simple put, even after all the court difficulties for researchers everyone who commits corruption is still entitled to an appeal, which can take even more time for a prosecutor to get a full conviction. Because of the time associated with trying to prosecute someone on corruption charges and record a lasting conviction to do some kind of statistical analysis researchers have looked to new tools to measure corruption. Some current methods used in the field of corruption studies for use of evaluating corruption in societies according to the Hungarian Gallup Institute (1999) take three different distinct paths.

- ① *Measuring general or target-group perception concerning corruption.*
- ② *Measuring incidences of corruptive activities (not necessarily actual*

corruption, but attempts or expectancy) also referred as proxy method.

③ *Using expert estimate about the level of corruption (e.g. BPI Brides Payer Index or CPI of Transparency International(p.3).*

That is why many researchers looking into corruption have begun to focus more on the perception of corruption and its perceived existence rather than on the empirical aspect (Johnston, 1994). To search out and find if corruption is in the military I will research and focus the study on evaluating corruption perceptions.

4) Perceptions

There is little empirical or theoretical literature bearing directly on military corruption perception. Despite this, we will attempt to explain the need of studying Soldier perceptions. The defining of any perception is hard as one tries to measure a complex matter; each person is individualist in mind and nature. Therefore, the measuring of corruption perception will be even harder as there are many facets of corruption, just like on a cut diamond. Research shows that personnel characteristics influence perceptions of individuals in a variety of occupational settings and across social boundaries. (Newmann, Rutter, & Smith, (1989). As Brasz (1970), concluded that corruption is what an individual perceives corruption to be. In part because the modern conception of corruption is intertwined with legalistic understandings of individual corruption, it focuses on individual behavior (Johnson, 1996, p13).

Characteristics and perceptions are a learned trait, according to Moustakas (1994), "perception is regarded as the primary source of knowledge, the source that cannot be doubted" (p. 52). Bruner & Postman (1949, 15), For a full understanding of the perceptual process it is necessary to vary not only the physical stimulus and the sensory state of the organism but also those central conditions—motives, predispositions, past learnings...so perception is a learned response to a changing physical stimulus. These stimuli have taken the following forms: education, religion, government, business, and personnel relations.

As discussed earlier perceptions are learned stimuli. The military does not train or teach the practice of corruption, it does teach ethics with the use of the Seven Army Values (e.g. Duty, Honor, Loyalty,...). The problem for the military is people bring their own suspicions into the Army environment, about people of different ethnicity or gender even when they are in fact trustworthy but because of false prejudices and preconceived notions hinders the mission and unit cohesiveness. Consequently, this lead us to remember that employees' perceptions on the social

performance of their work organizations may not be very accurate, employees' work attitudes are determined by their perceptions, regardless of the accuracy of the perceptions (Mahon, 2002; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Therefore, if perceptions of the organization could be false in nature, in the minds of Soldiers, then military leaders and academics need to ensure positive change happens, to change false images held by the Soldier. Time to measure accurately Soldiers' perceptions is needed to answer the ancient five W's (who, what, where, when, why) so we may develop ways to change them, to create a positive environment.

Yet, when actions taken by others in the environment that go away from learned and accepted norms and violates them for personnel gain or pleasure; then a person seeing such actions forms a perception that someone has done something wrong. This perception is corruption perception. Heidenheimer, named three distinct political system categories of corruption according to social perceptions:

① *White Corruption: Here corruptive behavior is largely viewed with tolerance this is typical for systems based on family ties and also for patron-client systems.*

③ *Grey corruption: This form of corruption is viewed with much less tolerance. It is reprehensible according to accepted moral standards, but the persons involved are still largely lacking any sense of doing something wrong. This is typical for modern constitutional states as well as for states undergoing a transformation towards a more democratic political culture.*

③ *Black corruption: Here corruption is generally despised and punished as a severe violation of moral standards and the law. This is characteristically found in societies shaped by modern media. (2002, p. 141)*

These social perceptions are difficult to measure because of culture, language, and the type of environment present in which the study takes place.

How does one measure a perception, especially corruption? Corruption is hard to calculate, but perception of it has increased. Greater freedom of the press has exposed the correlation (Gloster-Coates & Quest, 2005). Public perceptions are by in large formed from privately collected opinion polls by media agencies that market the created information for other agencies with their own agenda (Delgado, 2003). With that in mind, as a researcher, one must know what they truly are trying to measure, and for what audience the results will be displayed. In the beginning one must create several factors that relate to the perception you wish to measure and correlate well. These factors are important because they make up the framework from which individuals view their surroundings and evaluate their experiences (Bennett & Morabito, 2006, p 237). Then you can try to create indices to use in an

index that can measure the elusive perception of corruption by using multiple analytic tools.

5) Theory of Military Corruption and Corruption Perception

(1) Power Base Theory

The study draws from power based theory. At the root of all corruption is power. Without power to abuse or affect something then there is no basis for the foundation for corruption to exist and grow upon. People of all cultures socially construct power; no society has yet been created without some formal or informal power structure (Aguinis, Nesler, Quigley, & Tedeschi, 1994). Largely, it exists only because people tacitly agree to act as if it exists in order for society to function (Pinker, 2002). Society functions with the help of individually lead power based organizations. In the United States of America, those organizations are Federal and State governments with the numerous support agencies that provide national defense, local protection from crime and fire, and the thousands of social services that a Democratic society provide to the people.

With simply perceiving, that if an individual has power to affect oneself status thus in essence helping to create the reality of that power, insofar as one's beliefs, intentions, and actions of others change because of that perception (Fiol, O'Connor, & Aguinis, 2001; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998). Perceptions are constructed, by complex brain processes, from fleeting fragmentary scraps of data signaled by the senses and drawn from the brain's memory banks—themselves constructions from snippets of the past. On this view, normal everyday perceptions are not selections of reality but are rather imaginative construction—fictions—based... (Gregory 1972, p. 707). This perceived fiction becomes a reality for individuals and becomes like concrete in his or her mind and thus rigidly adhered to by the members of an organization. Once people integrate into an organization that is abusive in nature from the top down, they become desensitized to the environment if they do not leave the organization.

The definition of power has been defined into two constructs one being "power" the other as "leadership." Researchers generally agree that power is defined as the ability or potential to influence others to get something done (Fiol et al., 2001; French & Raven, 1959; Nesler, Aguinis, Quigley, & Tedeschi, 1993). Leadership is often defined as a process through which power is used to direct and coordinate the activities of group members to meet a goal (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). The U.S.

Army defines...Leadership is the influencing people—by providing purpose, direction and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization (U.S. Army, 1999, p.1-4). Leadership can be provided by anyone given the right place, circumstances, and authority. Whether or not the leadership provided is totally effective and useful is another matter. The ability to do something or not is the exercising of power. Whether or not the exercising of power is righteous or not depends on the situation, who wins and who can remember it and writes it down in the history books.

The United States of America's Armed Forces are organizations that are totally organized and function in a strictly defined power based structure. The U.S. Army is structured in the following organizational manner: Individual Soldier, Team, Squad, Platoon, Company, Battalion, Brigade, Division, Corps, Army, Major Area Command and lastly Secretary of the Army (U.S. Army, DA PAM, 1994). Its rank structure goes from E-1 to O-10 given it a combined structure of 29 levels of which 28 of those levels can be leadership positions depending on the situation. Individuals are considered in a direct leadership position by his or her inherent rank, the date of promotion they hold over other individuals, and the paragraph and line number position they are assigned to by the Military Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). Another way to be in a leadership position is by being put in charge by a superior of other individuals for a selected time to complete a detail or mission. In the Army, someone is always in charge and in a position of leadership no matter the situation. It is trained and expected of a Soldier to take charge of a situation if the Senior Leader is incapacitated in any manner, and complete the assigned mission in the absence of direct supervision.

There are many levels and leaders within the Army organization, it is easy for people to give off the perception of being corrupt and not be corrupt. It is just as easy for a corrupt leader to hide in so big an organization, especially one where people rotate to different duty stations to fill leadership positions. New people to military organizations must learn to both adapt to the power base structures of the organization and fit into the organization by accepting the mission and the goals of the organization, become a whistleblower or leave the organization.

(2) Military Corruption

The construct of Military Corruption defined as follows. Military Corruption is Fraud, Waste, Abuse, Bribery, Black-marketing and Favoritism caused by a military member while in performance of his or her military duties while serving in any

leadership position. Further, any corruption activities performed when a service member is physically out of uniform and off duty are still acts of military corruption. Because a service member is considered on duty 24 hours a day 7 days a week under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Military Code of Conduct. Until his or her enlistment contract or service obligation has expired. A military leader does not and cannot divest themselves of their leadership position regardless of them being on or off duty. Rank once earned and bestowed, is part of the individual, until the individual: ETS, retires, receives punishment resulting in reduction of rank and because of the reduction loses the leadership position. A service member is obligated to follow all Army Regulations both on and off duty until they separate from the military.

Defining further, military members can only be considered conducting military corruption. They cannot be considered performing other types of corruption, such as bureaucratic or personal corruption, until, they have exited the service. A prime example for contrasting Military Corruption is given; a politician who commits corruption while not performing his duties as a politician cannot lose their political position, as they did not perform the corruption as a politician, but as an individual citizen. Soldiers give up almost all their rights of being a free American citizen except, the right to vote while they serve in the military. Therefore, a Soldier cannot act as a free American citizen until he or she has left the service and received an honorable discharge, general discharge or a bad conduct discharge.

A further key distinction between a bureaucrat and a Soldier is a bureaucrat can and often does have high paying jobs outside of his or her political position. Many politicians still serve on company boards, teach, practice law or medicine, and are paid lecturers, while serving as a Congressmen or a Senator. Whereas a Soldier can have a part-time job, near his military base, with signed consent and approval of his Company Commander, as long as it does not interfere with his duties. Yet he or she cannot hold a political position, and be a Soldier at the same time, Army regulations and Federal Statues do not allow it.

(3) Military Corruption Perception

The following defines the construct of military corruption perception. Military corruption perception is the belief that a formal norm Formal norm is a written guideline that dictates action that are required or forbidden, these behaviors are taught, learned, retrained and enforced through regulations, policies or standard operating procedures. , informal norm Informal norm are unwritten rules or

standards that govern the behavior of a group. That is taught, trained and enforced, but is not written down in any regulation, e.g. always standing when a senior NCO or Officer enters the room until given permission to sit. or Army regulation has been perceived to been violated by anyone in a leadership position by a subordinate. This violation can take the form, in actions, such as: spoken or written words, physical body language, silence when questioned about decisions made, counter behavior where the leader says one thing and does another, and refusal to supply detailed information of instructions when tasks or missions are assigned, allowing a subordinate to take the blame for a leaders actions. These actions create the perception of wrongdoing and therefore corruption perception. Further explaining military corruption perception is that it is the breaking of the bonds of trust in a superior to subordinate relationship.³⁾ In addition, corruption perception can exist when a subordinate perceives and psychologically believes that the superior's actions and decisions is influenced by favoritism due to race, religion or similar background, and not by Army regulations, date of rank, and informal norms.

(4) Hypotheses

- ① Soldiers perceive some level of corruption within the organization; this perception will exist across rank.
- ② Soldiers perceived Fraud, Waste, Abuse and Favoritism in the organization; this perception will exist across Rank and Ethnicity.

3. Methodology

A survey was conduct on 561 individuals randomly in the 8thMilitary Police Brigade. The population of the study was conducted only on members assigned to the Eighth United States Army. Only U.S. Army personnel were sampled. The sample had two distinct subgroups: Soldiers that could reenlistand Soldiers that were in an indefinite reenlistment status. Of 561 randomly sampled only 352 participated in the study. Of that only 302 surveys returned were fully completed and eligible to be used in the study. Therefore, the study had a 53 percent response rate.

3) A superior to subordinate relationship is based on trust, that actions performed by a superior are within formal norms of the military culture, and that the superior is acting both ethically, and morally.

1) Descriptive Findings

The Reenlistment (RE) sub-group of the sample consists of Soldiers who have served in the Army less than 10 years of active service and still have the option to reenlist in the organization. The secondary category of this sample is the indefinite sub-group; it includes all Officers and Soldiers over 10 year of active federal service. In table 1, I summarize the characteristics of the both sub-groups of the sample.

Table 1 shows that the average RE Soldier mean age is 23.55, has served approximately over 3½ years, is unmarried and has completed high school. The average Indefinite Soldier mean age is 35.82, has served over 14½ years, is married and is a college graduate or has a master's degree. Findings are that Indefinite Soldiers on average are more likely married and have obtained higher rank and education levels than their subordinate Soldiers.

In table 1, the difference in gender composition is blaring for both the RE and Indefinite retention categories. Males are a clear majority between the Soldiers RE 76.7% and Indefinite 78.4 % categories, when compared to the Female Soldiers RE 23.9% and Indefinite 21.6% categories of the 8th Military Police Brigade. Male Soldiers outnumbers female Soldiers by a 3 - to - 1 ratio. Presently, women are excluded only from small amphibious vessels such as submarines and direct combat positions in infantry, artillery, and armor (Titunik, 2000 p. 230). When interpreting this table we can not generalize that everyone in the 8th Military Police Brigade is of the Military Police MOS, there are numerous support personnel with different MOSs that help the Military Police MOS specialties to be able to do their daily garrison mission and their wartime mission. Female Soldiers fill many of these support Military Occupational Specialties positions.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Soldiers in Re-up and Indefinite Status

Soldiers	Reenlistment		Indefinite		Reenlistment	Indefinite
Variable	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	Mean	Mean
Age					23.55	35.82
Time In Service					3.44	14.76
Gender						
Men	156	76.1	76	78.4		
Women	49	23.9	21	21.6		

Education

GED	8	3.9	-	-
High School	160	78.0	27	27.8
College Graduate	37	18.0	45	46.4
Master's Degree	-	-	25	25.8

Rank

Officer	-	-	32	33.0
Warrant Officer	-	-	4	4.1
NCO	62	30.2	61	62.9
Enlisted Soldier	143	69.8	-	-

Marital Status

Single	127	62.0	17	17.5
Married	65	31.7	67	69.1
Live in Partner	4	2.0	1	1.0
Divorced	9	4.4	11	11.3
Widowed	-	-	1	1.0

Race

White	114	55.6	49	50.5
Hispanic	24	11.7	6	6.2
Black	44	21.5	31	32.0
Asian	19	9.3	7	7.2
American Indian	4	2.0	4	4.1

Total	N=205		N=97	
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Lastly, the populations' racial composition in table 1 shows that White Soldiers are the prominent majority at 53.8 percent and are a 2 - to - 1 ratio against Black Soldiers, but are a 5 - to - 1 ratio when compared to Hispanics Soldiers in this organization. However, this significance is reduced once you look at senior personnel, where White Soldiers are at 50.3 percent when compared to Black Soldiers at 32 percent, the gap between races is almost reduced to a 1 to 1 ratio. Findings are that most Soldiers serving in the organization are white and male in both subgroups.

Next, I will discuss the findings of the variables included in the two indexes of Corruption Perception and Corruption. The Corruption Perception Index is constructed from two new variables. The first variable is constructed from

questions 17, 18, 19, and 20, which are meant to analyze the perception of corruption in the environment and in the promotion system; they form a separate variable named Corruption Environment (CPEN). I collapsed the responses from five response categories into three categories of Agree, Neutral and Disagree to aid in analysis while performing descriptive statistics. Summarizing the CPEN variable's results of the RE sub-group shows that the following types of corrupt environments are perceived at having the following agree response levels at N=205: Corruption Before ROK 29.3%, Corruption in the ROK 50.2%, Career Affected by Favoritism 35%, and Favoritism in Promotions 52.7%. Significant from the RE sub-group an average of 24% remained neutral on all four variables.

Next, when checking the CPEN variable's against the Indefinite sub-group category by conducting a frequency distribution shows the following agree results for N=97: Corruption Before ROK 45.4%, Corruption in the ROK 56.7%, Career Affected by Favoritism 39.2%, and Favoritism in Promotions 44.37%. Findings show that what is significant from the Indefinite group is one senior Soldiers see corruption before the ROK at double the rate of RE subgroup. An answer for this is most junior Soldiers of the RE group are involved only in a training environment before coming to Korea to serve⁴⁾ whereas senior Soldiers spend time at other permanent party installations. Second the Indefinite group is similar with the RE sub-group with 24.45% of the respondents remained neutral on all four variables. Therefore, a mean of 24.9% of the population remained neutral in both sub-groups of the sample on all the questions. In addition, with over 50% of both sub-groups believing there is a perceived environment of corruption present in the Eighth United States Army while being stationed in Korea. Lastly, both groups show similar results in the perception of career and promotion favoritism, with promotion favoritism perceived at a higher level. Soldiers that could benefit from promotion favoritism are in the ranks of E-1 through E-6. Control over these promotions is done mainly by the immediate supervisor's recommendation to the unit's First Sergeant/Command Sergeant Major who advises the Company/Battalion Commanders on whether or not a promotion should be approved. After the rank of E-6 a central promotion board handles all promotions to senior Noncommissioned Officer ranks, E-7 through E-9. The board only looks at a Soldier's official records and

4) A training environment is highly regimented and controlled and there is no permanent party Soldier involvement allowed with training Soldiers on training bases only their Drill Sergeants interact with them and instructors on a limited basis. Permanent party Soldiers are personnel who are not involved in initial Basic Individual Training (BIT) or Advance Individual Training (AIT) and assigned to MTOE units.

evaluations, it does not meet the Soldier, nor do the board members know the Soldiers name. A central promotion board is chaired by five Command Sergeant Majors and a General for each branch of the Army (e.g. Signal Branch, Infantry Branch, Military Police Branch, Artillery Branch ect.).

Lastly, the created variable Favoritism of the Corruption Perception Index constructed from the variables included in questions 10.1 through 10.5. These questions deal with and measure perceived Favoritism in the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the following: in application, favoritism, abuse of power, harsher on subordinates, and racial discrimination. Conducting frequency distributions for the Favoritism variable I once again collapsed the five response categories into threeresponse categories: agree, neutral and disagree. Descriptive statistics conducted on the different scales of perceived Favoritism variable for RE sub-group results shows the following agree responses for respondents'N=205: Application 31.2%, Favoritism 44.9%, abuse of power 53.2%, harsher on subordinates 64.4%, and racial discrimination 10.7%. The results show that there is almost no perception of punishments based on race alone. In addition, there are a significant percentage of the respondents saying there is a perception of abuse of power and that punishments are harder on subordinates.

A frequency distribution is conducted of the Favoritism variable's scales for the Indefinite sub-group results show the following responses were given N=97: Application 30.9%, Favoritism 35.1%, abuse of power 52.6%, harsher on subordinates 60.8%, and racial discrimination 5.2%. Findings show that both sub-groups believe that the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be manipulated by money, position, power or person with a response rate over 50% and that over 60% believe that subordinates are treated harsher under the Uniform Code of Military Justice than superiors.

The independent variables forming the Corruption Index (CI) are from survey questions6.1 through 6.5, which deal with singular perceived problems of corruption that may be present in the Army. Descriptive statistics using a frequency distribution checks initial response ranges. I collapsed the responses from five response categories into threecategories of Agree, Neutral and Disagree to aid in analysis while performing descriptive statistics. The higher the percentage score for agree the stronger the perception is notice by the sample. Summarizing variable of the RE sub-group show that the following types of corruption are perceived at the following agree response levels at N=205: Drugs 64%, Violence 68.3%, Fraud, Waste and Abuse 69.3%, Bribery 54.1% and Black Marketing at 58%. This shows a

moderately high percentage of the respondents perceiving that singular types of corruption are present and a problem in the Army.

Checking the Corruption Index variables against the Indefinite sub-group by conducting a second frequency distribution shows the following results for N=97: Drugs 60.8%, Violence 60.8%, Fraud, Waste and Abuse 79.4%, Bribery 45.4% and Black Marketing at 64.9%. These results show a moderate to high level of perceived corruption that is a problem in the Army by the respondents. Findings show a mean of 74 % of both sub-groups believing Fraud Waste and Abuse is a perceived major problem over other types of corruption in the Army. The other four variables of the CI have an average of 64% response rate showing that these are also moderate perceived problem in the Army.

2) Bivariate Analysis of Variables and Index Creation

I created originally two new variables and two indexes from the independent corruption, corruption perception variables of the study. The five independent variables of singular types of corruption of the Corruption Index were tested to see association (strength) of relationship between the variables by conducting a bivariate correlation. The respected correlation relationships of these variables of both sub-groups are displayed in table 2.

The findings of the bivariate correlation on the Corruption Index of known types of singular types of corruption shows a moderately significant positive relationship between the five singular types of corruption variables for both the RE and Indefinite category samples.

Next, internal consistency and reliability is tested by conducting Cronbach's Alpha test on the five variables. A Cronbach's Alpha test of internal consistency for the RE sample N=205 was assessed resulting with a value of .890 showing the 5 variables of singular types of corruption are highly correlated and considered adequate as a measurement, as a rule of thumb, we strive for alphas equal to or greater than .70 (Welch & Comer, 1983, p 241). This is met for the RE subgroup which is well above .80 the expected standard.⁵⁾ A Cronbach's Alpha test of internal consistency for the Indefinite sample N=97 was assessed resulting with a value of .854. Showing that the variables are highly correlated and that internally consistency is met. Therefore, the Corruption Index is a valid measure with which can be used in other statistical analysis to test for causality.

5) In current literature most researchers to an increased standard of .80 have replaced the .70 standard.

Table 2 Intercorrelations of variables for Corruption Index.

	Drugs	Violence	F r a u d , W a s t e , Abuse	Bribery	B l a c k Marketing
Drugs		.716(**)	.353(**)	.571(**)	.590(**)
Violence	.610(**)		.572(**)	.479(**)	.578(**)
Fraud, Waste, Abuse	.593(**)	.562(**)		.396(**)	.438(**)
Bribery	.642(**)	.625(**)	.633(**)		.696(**)
Black Marketing	.660(**)	.510(**)	.638(**)	.710(**)	

Note: I constructed the table to show both sub-groups correlations simultaneously. Correlation is based on the Combined Enlisted Re-up samples are presented below the diagonal line, and the Senior Indefinite is presented above the line. Re-up sample N=205 is ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). Senior Indefinite sample N=97 is ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).

The creating of the Corruption Perception Index, I explored a range of variables to explain the perception of corruption. In this section, I investigate the underlying constructs, which explain corruption perception. I did this by combining the two new variables of Corruption Perception Environment and Favoritism together. A Cronbach's alpha test on the new index showed a value of .838 showing that the index is highly correlated and internally consistent.

Shown in table 3, are the bivariate correlations of the variables for the Corruption Perception Environment for the Reenlistment subgroup and the indefinite sub-group.

The bivariate correlation of the variables shows a moderately significant positive relationship between the two environments and the perception of favoritism for both the Reenlistment sub-group and the indefinite subgroup.

A Cronbach's Alpha test of internal consistency for the RE sub-group at N=205 was assessed that internally consistency is close to the .80 standard with a value of .789 meaning the CPEN variables are highly correlated and still above the old standard of .70. Conducting a second Cronbach's Alpha test of internal consistency for the Indefinite sub-group at N=97 assessed shows a value of .765 meaning that the variables for the CPEN variable are highly correlated and is internally consistent. Findings show that the CPEN variable is a valid measure with which can be used in other statistical analysis to test for causality.

Table 3 Intercorrelations of Variables for CPEN Variable

	B e f o r e ROKCorruption	Corruption ROK	in Career Affected by Favoritism	F a v o r i t i s m Promotions
Corruption Before ROK		.656(**)	.427(**)	.383(**)
Corruption in ROK	.526(**)		.391(**)	.454(**)
Career Affected by Favoritism	.280(**)	.582(**)		.400(**)
F a v o r i t i s m Promotions	.326(**)	.555(**)	.584(**)	

Note: I constructed the table to show both sub-groups correlations simultaneously. Correlation is based on the Combined Enlisted Re-up samples are presented below the diagonal line, and the Senior Indefinite is presented above the line. Re-up sample N=205 is ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). Senior Indefinite sample N=97 is ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).

Next in Table 4, I conducted a bivariate correlation to test the variables of the newly created variable named Favoritism.

Table 4 Intercorrelations of Variables for Favoritism Variable

	UCMJ Fairly	Favoritism UCMJ CDR	U C M Manipulated By MPPP	UCMJ Harsher on Enlisted	CDR UCMJ Race
UCMJ Fairly		.307(**)	.350(**)	.222(**)	.189
Favoritism UCMJ CDR	.373(**)		.331(**)	.152	.328(**)
UCMJ Manipulated By MPPP	.397(**)	.616(**)		.349(**)	.281(**)
UCMJ Harsher on Enlisted	.384(**)	.419(**)	.567(**)		.085
CDR UCMJ Race	-.006	.308(**)	.278(**)	.197(**)	

Note: I constructed the table to show both sub-groups correlations simultaneously. Correlation is based on the Combined Enlisted Re-up samples are presented below the diagonal line, and the Senior Indefinite is presented above the line. Re-up sample N=205 is ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). Senior Indefinite sample N=97 is ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).

The variables come from survey questions 10.1 through 10.5. The questions cover the areas in which possible favoritism in the command may be present, perceived

and shown in the justice system.

In table 4, it shows us that all five variables of the Favoritism variable for the Reenlistment sample are low to moderately correlated with the variable of CDR UCMJ Race showing no significant correlation with UCMJ Fairly. Next, table 5 shows that the variables of Favoritism for the indefinite sample have a low positive direct relationship. A Cronbach's Alpha test of internal consistency was assessed for the Reenlistment subgroup it produced a value of .735 showing moderately high relationship, that is below the golden standard value of .80 but is still acceptable by researchers as it is well above the value of .70. A Cronbrach's Alpha test of internal consistency for the Indefinite subgroup was assessed with a value of .640, which is not recommend to use and should be discarded because it is to low. Findings show that the Favoritism variable is valid for the Reenlistment group but not for the Indefinite group. Its use should be limited at this time to only the Reenlistment subgroup of this sample.

3) Chi-Square test of Background Variables

In table 5, I depict the results of a Chi-Square test of relationship using the background variables and the 47 variables of the RE subgroup of the study. Only those variables that showed a significant dependant relationship with corruption and corruption perception are displayed.

Table 5 Chi Square test of RE sub-group with Background Variables

Control Variables	Value	Df	Asymp Sig	Variable
Income	29.621	16	.020	Favoritism UCMJ CDR
Rank	11.891	4	.018	Drugs
Ethnicity	27.727	16	.034	Favoritism UCMJ CDR
Ethnicity	29.616	16	.020	UCMJ Harsher on Enlisted
Ethnicity	28.867	16	.025	Favoritism Promotion
TIS	28.357	8	.000	UCMJ Harsher On Enlisted

Note: RE is the abbreviation for the Reenlistment subgroup.

Only the background variables of Income, Rank, Ethnicity and TIS in table 6 show a dependent relationship with the variables of corruption and corruption perception.

In table 6, I depict the results of a Chi-Square test of relationship using the background variables and the 47 variables of Senior sub-group of the study.

Table 6 Chi Square test of Seniors sub-group with Background Variables

Background	Value	Df	Asymp Sig	Variable
Education	18.265	6	.006	Fraud Waste Abuse
Rank	29.792	8	.000	UCMJ Harsher On Enlisted
Rank	20.374	8	.009	Favoritism Promotions
Ethnicity	32.376	16	.009	UCMJ Fairly
Ethnicity	33.741	16	.006	Career Affected By Favoritism
TIS	29.886	16	.019	UCMJ Harsher on Enlisted
TIS	28.859	16	.025	Favoritism Promotions

Note: Seniors are identified with the indefinite category.

Only those variables that showed a significant dependant relationship with the Background variables are shown to assist in testing hypotheses 1, and hypotheses 2. Of the eight background variables tested only the four variables of Education, Rank, Ethnicity and TIS show a dependent significant relationship with the variables of corruption and corruption perception.

4) Hypotheses Testing

Next, in the crosstab in table 7, I show a dependant relationship of a Chi-Square test of one of the CI variables. The variable of Drugs with the background variable of Rank to aid in testing Hypotheses one in table 7 and 8.

In the RE sub-group the background variable of Rank showed a significant dependent relationship with the CI variable Drugs, the other corruption variables though perceived did not have a significant relationship. Drugs are showing a relationship with rank as a problem in the Army. As with institutions in the private and public world, each year testing of Soldiers in the military for drugs by conducting Unit Level Urinalysis testing happens, and it is discovered some Soldiers do take illegal drugs. Once caught in this type of corruption Junior Soldiers are usually given a chance to go through a drug treatment program if the Commander deems the Soldier salvageable. If the Commander deems the Soldier is unsalvageable, either they are imprisoned or discharged with a bad conduct discharge. Senior Soldiers are thought to know better and are only imprisoned or discharge. The using of drugs is a basic building block to higher forms of corruption, for example: violence, theft, bribery and black marketing of stolen or contraband items.

Table 7 Chi-Square Tests between Rank and Drugs RE Subgroup

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.891(a)	4	.018
Likelihood Ratio	10.988	4	.027
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.127	1	.288
N of Valid Cases	205		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.44.

Table 8 Crosstab between Rank and Drugs on RE Subgroup

			Drugs					Total
			Strongly Agree	Agree	N or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Rank	NCO	Count	25	11	9	12	5	62
		Expected Count	24.8	15.1	10.9	5.7	5.4	62.0
	Enlisted Soldier	Count	57	39	27	7	13	143
		Expected Count	57.2	34.9	25.1	13.3	12.6	143.0
Total		Count	82	50	36	19	18	205
		Expected Count	82.0	50.0	36.0	19.0	18.0	205.0

In tables 7 to 8I show that a significant dependent relationship exists between the variables of CI and the variables of the study and that the crosstab shows both ranks responses strongly agree (82) and agree (50) perceiving that drugs is a problem in the Army. Therefore, it is evident that the hypotheses one is proven true that a relationship does exist between CI and it exists across all ranks.

The testing of hypotheses two is whether "Soldiers perceived Fraud, Waste, Abuse

and Favoritism in the organization; this perception will exist across Rank and Ethnicity." Next, in table 9I show cross tabulations of CPI Variable of Favoritism and Ethnicity to help in testing Hypotheses two in table 9 and 10.

Table 9 Crosstab between Ethnicity and Favoritism Promotions of RE

			Favoritism Promotions					Total
			Strongly Agree	Agree	N Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Ethnicity	White	Count	36	31	24	16	7	114
		Expected Count	30.0	30.0	28.9	18.4	6.7	114
	Hispanic	Count	3	5	9	7	0	24
		Expected Count	6.3	6.3	6.1	3.9	1.4	24
	Black	Count	12	11	13	6	2	44
		Expected Count	11.6	11.6	11.2	7.1	2.6	44
	Asian Pacific	Count	2	7	6	3	1	19
		Expected Count	5.0	5.0	4.8	3.1	1.1	19
	Indian	Count	1	0	0	1	2	4
		Expected Count	1.1	1.1	1.0	.6	.2	4
Total	Count		54	54	52	33	12	205
	Expected Count		54.0	54.0	52.0	33.0	12.0	205

Table 10 Chi-Square Tests results Ethnicity with Favoritism Promotions of RE

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.867(a)	16	.025
Likelihood Ratio	24.235	16	.084
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.093	1	.079
N of Valid Cases	205		

a. 11 cells (44.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

In the RE sub-group the control variable of Ethnicity showed a significant dependent relationship with the independent CPI variables of Favoritism Promotions, Favoritism in UCMJ, UCMJ is Harsher on Enlisted, the other CPI variables though perceived did not have a dependent significant relationship response.

Next in the following tables 11 and 12 I will evaluate a cross tabulations of Corruption Perception Variables and Rank to help in testing Hypotheses one.

Table 11 Chi-Square Tests between Rank and UCMJ Harsher on Enlisted Seniors

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.792(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	30.828	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	22.059	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	97		

a. 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .16.

Table 12 Crosstab between Rank and UCMJ Harsher on Enlisted for Seniors

			UCMJ Harsher On Enlisted					Total
			Strongly Agree	Agree	N Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Rank	Officer	Count	4	5	12	9	2	32
		Expected Count	11.5	7.9	7.9	3.3	1.3	32.0
	Warrant Officer	Count	1	1	2	0	0	4
		Expected Count	1.4	1.0	1.0	.4	.2	4.0
	NCO	Count	30	18	10	1	2	61
		Expected Count	22.0	15.1	15.1	6.3	2.5	61.0
Total		Count	35	24	24	10	4	97
		Expected Count	35.0	24.0	24.0	10.0	4.0	97.0

Note: N=97

In tables 9 through 12 I show that significant dependent relationship exists between the variables of CPI and the variables of the study and that the crosstab shows both Ethnicity and Rank perceiving that Favoritism, and UCMJ is Harsher on Enlisted is a problem in the Army. Therefore, it is evident that the hypotheses two is proven true that a relationship does exist between CPI and it exists across all ranks and ethnicities.

5) Limitationsof the Study

This study brings to light a topic that many in the academic community and military community choose not to deal with andthat is corruption and corruption perception. The idea that those whose duty it is to protect us or fight beside us are either corrupt, dealing with corruption, or perceiving corruption in the rank, and file, is terrifying to say the least. It is hoped by opening Pandora's box we can deal with the results as adults. Though we cannot stuff what has escaped back into the box, we can deal with and find ways to defeat these perceptions. It is evident that there is corruption and corruption perception and it exists in the military and validated by study. It is evident by descriptive statistics alone that a high percentage of the sample perceives that corruption and corruption perception is present.

This research is limited to the building of an empirical database file. This database file was used to establish relationships of independent variables of corruption, and corruption perception. In addition, the independent variables of corruption, and corruption perception were tested to establish relationships with background variables of age, time in service, education. Currently, this model design is specifically for the United States of America's Army forces in the Republic of Korea. The survey instrument can be modified to analyze other Armies. Limitations of this study include:

1. A major limitation of this study is the inherent problem of reporting corruption or the perceiving of corruption. Even though the study was voluntary and no one was forced to participate, it is hard for people to be comfortable talking about such a taboo topic. The study also asks hard questions on trust, which is the basic building block of unit cohesion in the Army.
2. Restricting the sample to just one Major Subordinate Command (MSC) due to time, the cost of expanding the study, and seeking permission of the other 8 MSC Commanders was not feasible at this time for this researcher.
3. The limiting of the study to one MSC may have had the disadvantage of leading to results that could not generalize to other types of organizations, but has the advantage of reducing systematic error variance due to MSC's organization type being Military Police or the mission of Law Enforcement (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2002).
4. The military does not allow Soldiers to participate or conduct personal research on duty time as it will distract from the organization's mission.

The survey instrument was administered for a 90-day period starting on 20 March 2006 to reduce impact on Soldier's off time and ability to prepare for and conduct his or her daily missions on deterring North Korean aggression and protecting the property and lives of United States Forces Korea.

4. Conclusions

The major research question of the study was, "What are the perceived problems that are sources of corruption?"

According to data the perceived problems of corruption are: Illegal Drug Use and Trafficking (62%), Violence Soldier to Soldier (65%), Fraud Waste and Abuse (72%), Bribery (51%), and Black-marketing (60%). All areas show that this perception exists across all ranks. Thus, the study showed that Hypotheses 1 is true and Hypotheses 2 is true that corruption exists across Race and Ethnicity.

The study shows that corruption and corruption perception exists in the military. It is now the job of this researcher to take it to the next level and explore the affects of Corruption and Corruption Perception within the Army. An apple that shows small patches of rot is usually not selected by a perspective buyer nor kept by an owner, it is thrown out. This is not an option; we can do with an organization as big as the United States Army. We must strive to stamp out corruption and corruption perception and get on with the mission and goal of the Army.

As for public administration academics, I hope this study has shown the need to study the military as part of public administration now and in the futures. The study shows that the military has an urgent need for more corruptions studies from a public administration aspect and that now another area has been opened and initially explored.

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